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GRADUATE COLLEGE

THE HISTORICISM OF JOSÉ ORTEGA Y GASSET

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY
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degree of
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Norman, Oklahoma
1973

THE HISTORICISM OF JOSÉ ORTEGA Y GASSET

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PREFACE

José Ortega y Gasset is widely regarded as the foremost Hispanic philosopher of this century. His book The Revolt of the Masses has given him world-wide stature as a philosopher. I wish to show in this dissertation that, although Ortega's fame is in many ways justified, his philosophical system is badly flawed, and most especially, that his philosophy of history is full of grave errors.

Two central ideas in Ortega's philosophy of history will be treated in detail. The first is his view that man has no nature but only a history. The second is his notion of "historical reason," which he puts forward as the uniquely appropriate method for understanding both man's history and man's future.

In order to treat adequately these two central ideas, it will be necessary to give an account of the main features of Ortega's philosophical system. This will be done in the first chapter, and the discussion will involve "my life" as basic reality, the way in which beliefs affect that basic reality, Ortega's theory of perspectivism, his idea of technology, and his notion of generation.

In Chapter Two, I will treat Ortega's thesis that man has no nature but only a history. "Historical reason"

will be the subject of Chapter Three. Ortega's treatment of each theme is scattered throughout his work, and his position on each question must, to some extent, be pieced together. In Chapters Two and Three, I will attempt to present his position in the most favorable light possible, deferring criticism until after his views have been presented.

The criticism of Ortega's philosophy of history will proceed from three directions. First, certain contradictions will be derived from within Ortega's own writings. One of these is the simultaneous necessity and impossibility of knowing all of man's history. These contradictions are the subject of the fourth chapter.

The second line of criticism will be an attempt to show that Ortega's belief in a special type of "reason" needed for the understanding of history and social science is based on a misunderstanding of the methods of physical science, and an exaggeration of the differences between the study of man and the study of nature. This critique will make extensive use of the methods and arguments developed by Karl R. Popper in his books The Open Society and its Enemies, The Poverty of Historicism, and Conjectures and Refutations. Chapter Five will be devoted to the development of Popper's arguments against what he calls "historicism," and Chapter Six will show how these arguments apply to Ortega, especially how they apply to "historical reason."

The third line of criticism will be an attack on Ortega's assertion that man has no nature but only a history. This line of criticism will be pursued in Chapter Seven. First, I will review the criticism of Ortega's position offered by the Mexican Jesuit José Sánchez Villaseñor in his rather widely known work Ortega y Gasset, Existentialist. Villaseñor attacks Ortega's "historical" conception of man from a Thomistic point of view, and asserts that Ortega's work leads to nihilism, and cannot support an ethic strong enough even to condemn mass murder. While I accept neither Villaseñor's premises nor his arguments, I think his conclusions can be justified. I will try to show, using in part the work of Albert Camus, that Ortega's philosophy is indeed insufficient to provide an ethic capable of condemning mass murder, although, of course, there is no suggestion that Ortega advocates any such thing. His views, I will argue, allow only an ethic like that used by Camus in his early work (The Stranger, etc.) which Camus found inadequate and later strongly modified.

In the final chapter, I will argue that harsh interpretations and the need to modify and overcome his philosophy are things which Ortega himself knew would be necessary. His concepts of progress in philosophy, and of perspectivism, will be used to show that, for him, no philosophy is final, and that errors must be assimilated and corrected before we can move closer to truth.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Works by José Ortega y Gasset

<u>HAAS</u>	<u>History as a System.</u>
<u>MAC</u>	<u>Man and Crisis.</u>
<u>MAP</u>	<u>Man and People.</u>
<u>MOQ</u>	<u>Meditations on Quixote.</u>
<u>OC</u>	<u>Obras Completas.</u>
<u>TMT</u>	<u>The Modern Theme.</u>
<u>TROTM</u>	<u>The Revolt of the Masses.</u>
<u>WIP</u>	<u>What is Philosophy?</u>

Works by Karl R. Popper

<u>OAR</u>	<u>Conjectures and Refutations.</u>
<u>TLOSD</u>	<u>The Logic of Scientific Discovery.</u>
<u>TOSAIE I</u>	<u>The Open Society and its Enemies, Volume I.</u>
<u>TOSAIE II</u>	<u>The Open Society and its Enemies, Volume II.</u>
<u>TPOH</u>	<u>The Poverty of Historicism.</u>

THE HISTORICISM OF JOSÉ ORTEGA Y GASSET

CHAPTER I

AN INTRODUCTION TO ORTEGA'S SYSTEM

In this dissertation I give a critique of certain aspects of the philosophy of José Ortega y Gasset. Some readers may find the critique quite harsh. It therefore seems appropriate to begin by giving several reasons why Ortega is a philosopher worth criticizing.

First, the epochal influence Ortega has had on the thought of the Spanish-speaking world must be acknowledged. In order to appreciate the magnitude of this influence, it is necessary to examine the condition of Spanish philosophy in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. From the death of Francisco Suárez in 1617 until the twentieth century, Spain simply dropped out of the philosophical world.¹ Suárez' scholastic works were the main philosophical texts for all of that nearly three-hundred-year period.² Only the minor thinkers, Jaime Balmes and Julián Sans del Río, both in the middle of the nineteenth century, intruded onto this philosophical desert.³ Spain was utterly uninterested in the works of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant or Hegel. When there finally was a powerful philosophical thinker in Spain, Miguel de Unamuno, he saw fit to exhort the Spanish to

continue in their isolation from Europe, preferring the "African" side of the Spanish character to the European.⁴

At this point, José Ortega y Gasset came upon the Spanish scene. He developed a keen interest in all things European. He went to Germany, to Marburg, to study philosophy and returned determined to "level the Pyrennees."⁵ Indeed, one of his early works, Invertebrate Spain, was an attempt to exhort the Spanish people to come out of their self-imposed isolation and awaken to the three centuries of European thought that they had missed. It was his fervor to "Europeanize" Spain that led him to write much of his work in newspapers and magazines of general readership and which also led him to found the journal Revista de Occidente which was dedicated to the propagation of the best in European thought. Ortega might have been a better philosopher had he stayed in Germany and associated exclusively with philosophers and exposed his ideas in the philosophical journals. He did not do this because he felt that his duty, his vocation as he called it, lay to the Hispanic world.⁶

It is largely due to the efforts of Ortega that philosophy flourishes in Spain and throughout Latin America. It would be nearly impossible to overrate his influence. It is clear that Ortega is a great figure in philosophy, and this would be true even if his philosophical system had little merit. This, however, is surely not the case.

Ortega is an interesting and original thinker who would deserve study even if he were not such a historically influential thinker. Here I would like to list some of his merits. To begin with, there is his excellent style. He is a master writer with a gift for the arresting phrase and the apt metaphor. Secondly, he was one of the first philosophers of the century to write about themes which later acquired the name "existential." As early as 1914 he was discussing life as ship-wreck, men as condemned to be free, and the anxiety that befalls man when his world-view collapses. Thirdly, there is the remarkable breadth of Ortega's work. He seems to write on everything. Consider some of his book titles: On Love, The Dehumanization of Art, History as a System, Some Lessons in Metaphysics, Mission of the University, The Revolt of the Masses. These titles indicate his very wide range of interests. Within these works, he treats such unusual topics as the origins of the Tibetan state and the system of salutations employed by the African Tuareg. These remarks should make it clear that Ortega is a complex, interesting writer, well worthy of study.⁷

I will now take up some of the major concepts of Ortega's philosophical system with two purposes in mind. First, in order to discuss his philosophy of history in detail, it is necessary to see how that philosophy of history is integrated into his philosophical system.

Second, it is my view that certain parts of Ortega's philosophy of history contradict other parts of his philosophy, and to show this contradiction, it is necessary to treat that overall system, at least in outline form.

Ortega's philosophy begins with a single crucially important sentence: "I am I and my circumstances" ("Yo soy yo y mi circunstancia").⁸ This sentence contains within it a bold attempt to solve the subject-object problem by asserting the primacy of me-and-my-world over the abstractions of subject and object. World never exists without a subject, whose world it is, and no ego or subject ever exists without its world. The basic reality is always the union of I-with-world, me-and-my-circumstances.

In his series of lectures What is Philosophy?, which dates from 1938, Ortega gave an account of how he arrived at me-and-my-circumstances as the fundamental philosophical datum. His account involves a retracing of the steps of Descartes, in which his purpose is the same as that of Descartes: to find a place to begin, something or some things which are indubitable. All such indubitables Ortega calls "data of the Universe."⁹ He accepts that Descartes discovered a datum of the Universe in his famous cogito. Ortega puts it this way: "thought is the only thing in the Universe whose existence cannot be denied, because to deny is to think."¹⁰

At this point, Ortega gives a rather unusual twist

to his treatment of Descartes. He sees Descartes as the founder (perhaps the unwitting founder) of modern idealism. The method of universal doubt and the discovery of thought as the only indubitable lead to a subordination of things to ideas, and this in turn tends to idealism.

We cannot take as our point of departure the reality of the outside world: everything that surrounds us, all bodies including our own, are suspect in their pretension that they exist in themselves and independently of our thinking of them. But on the other hand, it cannot be doubted that all this exists in my thought, as my ideas, as cogitationes. The result is that the mind becomes the center and support of all reality.... This principle leads one to attempt a system of explanation of what there is, interpreting all that appears to be neither thought nor idea as consisting merely in having been thought, in being idea. This system is idealism, and modern philosophy since Descartes has been idealist at root.¹¹

We will misunderstand Ortega if we do not keep in mind the fact that he includes the cogito of Descartes when he uses the word "idealism." He is, of course, aware that Descartes was a dualist.

Ortega thinks that idealism is false, that it distorts reality by giving an unwarranted priority to the self over the world, and by creating the "problem" of the existence of the world, a problem that Ortega sees as a pseudo-problem. He thinks that the way to see the situation correctly is to go back and find, in Descartes, the error which started idealism.

Ortega tells us that what is really asserted in the

cogito is the following: "thought exists, it is; therefore I exist, I am."¹² The first part, thought exists, is the correct part. But the second part does not follow from it if we see that in saying "I exist," Descartes was positing the existence of a mental substance behind the appearance "thought going on." The two parts of the cogito are on a different level: thought is an indubitable, while the existence of a mental substance is a supposition which is highly dubitable.

What if we grant Ortega his point? Are we any better off with the primary datum "thought exists" than we were with Descartes' original? Ortega believes we are, because to him the meaning of the phrase "thought exists" is that a self and a world (or perhaps its world) exist, are locked together in mutual co-existence. He argues that all thought implies the existence of a subject who thinks and an object which is thought. But this subject and this object have no substantial existence apart from their relation, and this relation exists in a realm of thought. Well, if subject and object are so locked together, and as far as we know, exist only in thought, do we not have an idealism similar to that of Berkeley? Ortega thinks not. He insists that when we perceive an object, we perceive it as an object and not as an idea, distinct from us, although related to us. There is no primacy of the mental. "I am not a substantial being nor is the world, but we are in active

correlation; I am that which sees the world and the world is that which is seen by me. I exist for the world, and the world exists for me."¹³

Ortega calls this primary datum of reality, this co-existence of me-and-my-world, "my life." For him it is the primary reality within which all other realities, secondary realities, are found. For instance, the "life" of another person "is only a presumption...not radically, unquestionably, primordially 'reality'...One property of the radical reality that is my life is that it contains within it many presumed realities, or realities of the second order."¹⁴

I might note here that I do not accept the doctrine of "my life" as "solving" such philosophical problems as the mind-body problem or the problem of the external world. I present the doctrine because it is Ortega's starting point and I do wish to give an outline of his system. Without the notion of "my life" as primary reality, it would be very difficult to make sense out of some of his other doctrines, especially his idea of perspective. With this said, I will try to show how Ortega builds his system on the datum of "my life."

Ortega describes the character of one's life as pre-occupation. Man is always engaged in the future--the what-to-do-next. "Every moment of the day we are having to decide what we are going to do the next moment, what it is that will occupy our lives. This is occupying ourselves in

anticipation, pre-occupying ourselves.¹⁵ Not only is our life at each moment occupied with the future, but this futural aspect of our life gives it a different kind of being from that of rocks or trees. Our life is not a thing in the world. Also, although our life is not just what we choose it to be, neither is it completely given to us as is the "life" of a stone. "Life is at the same time freedom and fatality; it is being free within a given destiny."¹⁶ Life has the characteristics of being ship-wrecked, one of Ortega's favorite metaphors.

The world into which man is thrown presents him with possibilities, some hostile and some inviting. "In order to sustain himself in the environment he is always having to do something."¹⁷ This state of at each moment having to act Ortega calls alteración.

Since each life is lived toward the future, in anticipation, living requires knowledge. We need knowledge of the consequences of actions in order to decide what to do. Now Ortega's theory of knowledge is quite unusual and original. He sees each life as an opening to a reality but only a part of reality. Each man is like a sensitized net which can, so to speak, "catch" certain truths but which misses all others.

When a sieve or a net is placed in a current of liquid it allows certain things to permeate it and keeps others out; it might be said to make a choice, but assuredly not to alter the forms of things. This is the function of the knower,

of the living being face to face with the cosmic reality of his environment. He does not allow himself, without more ado, to be permeated by reality, as would the imaginary rational entity created by rationalist definitions. Nor does he invent an illusory reality. His function is clearly selective. From the infinite number of elements which integrate reality the individual or receiving apparatus admits a certain proportion, whose form and substance coincide with the meshes of his sensitized net. The rest, whether phenomena, facts or truths, remain beyond him. He knows nothing of them and does not perceive them.¹⁸

The analogy holds for both individuals and societies.

Similarly, all peoples and all epochs have their typical souls, that is to say, their nets, provided with meshes of definite sizes and shapes which enable them to achieve a strict affinity with some truths and to be incorrigibly inept for the assimilation of others.¹⁹

This ability to grasp a part of reality Ortega calls a perspective. Each man lives a perspective, or a point of view. "Every life is a point of view directed upon the Universe."²⁰ This means that all truth is partial, for to have the whole truth would mean simultaneously living all perspectives. While this is clearly impossible, it is both possible and desirable to get inside as many perspectives as we can by studying history and attempting to recreate past perspectives. The tool for doing this Ortega calls historical reason, which will be treated in detail in Chapter Three.

What Ortega is trying to do with his perspectivist theory is to combat the errors of both Rationalism and Relativism. Rationalism errs in trying to take an abstract disembodied view of reality. Relativism asserts that there

is no truth at all. Ortega wants to say there is truth, but only partial, perspectival truth. It may seem that Ortega's position is just a new kind of relativism, but he does a kind of "Copernican" revolution on this point. He says that in the past relativists have thought that reality was absolute and our knowledge of it uncertain, changing, relative. For Ortega, our knowledge is absolute; it is reality that is relative. He claims Einstein's theory of relativity as the source for his view, and sees the science of Newton as the source of the old relative view.²¹

In the old relativism our knowledge is relative because what we aspire to know, viz., space-time reality, is absolute and we can not attain to it. In the physics of Einstein our knowledge is absolute; it is reality that is relative.²²

So far then, we have "my life" as our primary phenomenon, and the understanding that this life lives a perspective, a partial truth, and that it is not a thing but a project to be acted out. Ortega makes this last point vivid with the expression, "man is the novelist of himself."²³ Generally, my life is lived in involvement, in activity, in alteración. This is really no different than the life of animals, who are always occupied in coping with their environment. Man, however, is the only animal capable of a state which Ortega calls ensimismamiento. In this state man formulates concepts about himself and his world which later became a part of his circumstances, a new part of his

world. This is distinctly human, this living with concepts and beliefs.²⁴

In addition to formulating concepts in the state of ensimismamiento, man formulates new needs, for he wants more than to live. His desire to live "is inseparable from his desire to live well."²⁵ This creation of needs, of wanting the objectively superfluous, is the source of human technology.²⁶ It is what sharply differentiates man's life from all other types of life. "Whereas life in the biological sense is a fixed entity defined for each species once and for all, life in the human sense of good life is always mobile and infinitely variable."²⁷

In addition to man's constantly changing needs and the consequent changing technology, there is another aspect of human life which is ever-present but not fixed. That is its vital belief-structure. Each life is lived in a belief-structure. "Man is always in the grip of a belief, and in the midst of things he lives out of that belief in conformity with it."²⁸ In traditionalist periods, this belief-structure may be so strong and so unquestioned that it seems to be a part of the world, not a created human structure. In times of crisis, these belief-structures may completely collapse and result in a period of great human activity to bring forth new belief-structures in which men may live.

Later, Ortega's account of the European crisis of belief of about 1600 when the scientific world view became

the view of modern man will be considered.²⁹ The important point for now is that man is always a creature who has beliefs. These "universes" may be culturally given in a "tranquil" time, chosen from a given set of culturally given possibilities, or created literally ex nihilo in a time of crisis.

An important point about the belief structure is that it is always changing. Moreover, the change is not, for Ortega, a continuous one but one which moves in generational jumps. This brings us to one of Ortega's most original and controversial concepts: the concept of the generations. He believes that man never lives in isolation but always in society, and that each man lives bound up with his contemporaries, with his generation. At any given moment, a society is divided into three groups: the young, the middle-aged and the old. The middle-aged form the generation whose belief structure is in force. They are the principal actors in each period. "But [the] world changes with every generation for the very reason that the previous generation has done something in the world, has left it somewhat different from the way it found it."³⁰

Each of the three coexisting generations has a different perspective, sees truth differently, or better, sees different aspects of the truth. This reality of three sharply distinct generations coexisting in any given time is the basis for never-ending change, for history. The gen-

eration is "the pivot responsible for the movements of historical evolution."³¹ Clearly the concept of the generations is crucial for Ortega's philosophy of history, and it will be treated in detail in Chapter Three.

This overview of Ortega's philosophy should provide a sufficient "frame" in which to set his philosophy of history. In the next two chapters his philosophy of history will be examined in detail.

FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER I

¹Neil McInness, "Spanish Philosophy," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1967), VII, pp. 511-516.

²Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy (Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1963), III, p. 378.

³Nothing could more clearly show the utterly impoverished state of Spanish philosophy from 1617 to 1900 than the career of Julián Sans del Río. Appointed professor of Philosophy at the University of Madrid in 1843, he was sent to Germany to study the latest and best in European thought. Sans del Río managed to overlook all the great German thinkers from Kant to Hegel and selected for export to Spain the works of Karl C. F. Krause (1781-1832), an obscure German mystic. Sans del Río returned to Spain eager to spread the work of Krause and there was born one of the strangest schools of philosophy ever seen: the school of Spanish Krausism.

⁴See José Ferrater Mora, Unamuno. Translated by Philip Silver (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962). Especially see Chapter 4, "Spain-Quixotism."

⁵For an excellent account of Ortega's intellectual development and his relation to the Marburg Circle, see

Julián Marías, José Ortega y Gasset: Circumstance and Vocation. Translated by Frances M. López-Morillas (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970).

⁶See Marías, Circumstance and Vocation.

⁷For an extended treatment of Ortega's style, see Marías, Circumstance and Vocation. For documentation of Ortega's originality, and the tracing back of most of his major ideas to 1914, see the Introduction and Notes, also by Marías, to Ortega's MOQ. I do think, however, that Marías is much too much of an uncritical "follower" of Ortega.

⁸MOQ, p. 45.

⁹WIP, p. 137.

¹⁰WIP, p. 145.

¹¹WIP, p. 152.

¹²WIP, p. 188.

¹³WIP, p. 199.

¹⁴MAP, p. 95.

¹⁵WIP, p. 249.

¹⁶WIP, p. 241.

¹⁷MAC, p. 22.

¹⁸TMT, p. 88.

¹⁹TMT, p. 89.

²⁰TMT, p. 91.

²¹Hume would be a good example of what Ortega means by a relativist.

²²TMT, p. 138.

²³HAAS, p. 203.

²⁴See the essay, "Ideas y Creencias" ("Ideas and Beliefs"), OC, V, pp. 377-489.

²⁵HAAS, p. 98.

²⁶See Ortega's fascinating essay "Man the Technician" in HAAS. His treatment of technology is remarkable and worthy of an extended study, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

²⁷HAAS, p. 101.

²⁸MAC, p. 160.

²⁹This is the subject of Ortega's Man and Crisis.

³⁰MAC, pp. 50-51.

³¹TMT, p. 15.

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORICALITY OF MAN'S BEING

Ortega emphatically states that "Man...has no nature; what he has is...history. Expressed differently: what nature is to things, history is to man."¹ In order to understand what Ortega means by this and why he asserts it, we must distinguish three types of being which are ordered in a hierarchy in his system. These are the being of inanimate objects, the being of life-forms other than man, and the being of human life. Recall as we do this, however, that all being resides ultimately in the basic reality, "my life."

"Now there is no awkwardness in saying that things, the Universe, God Himself, are contained within my life, because 'my life' is not myself alone, not only the subject I; my living includes the world."² Nevertheless, Ortega still discusses separately the kind of "being" which inanimate objects and other life forms have, even though that being is contained in human life.

He uses the example of the stone to characterize the being of inanimate objects. What characterizes the stone is that its being is completely given. "The stone is given its existence; it need not fight for being what it is--a stone in the field."³ The stone will fall if dropped, and we know precisely how it will fall. The stone is just what

it is; all its properties are given, fixed and predictable, and this would still be so even if the stone were conscious.

We can imagine a very intelligent stone; but as the inner being of the stone is given it already made, once and for all, and it is required to make no decision on the subject, it has no need, in order to go on being a stone, to pose and pose again the problem of self, asking itself 'What must I do now?' or, which is the same thing, 'What must I be?' Tossed into the air, without need to ask itself anything, and therefore without having to exercise its understanding, the stone that we are imagining will fall toward the center of the earth. Its intelligence, even if existent, forms no part of its being, does not intervene in it, but would be an extrinsic and superfluous addition.⁴

Objects like stones are ideally suited for study by the methods of physical science. Man's being, we shall see, is not so suited. Life-forms other than man have a different type of being, intermediate between stones and men. We will consider only animal life, as Ortega restricts his discussion of non-human life to animal life. The being of animals is identical with a large part of the being of human life. Animal life consists entirely of that state which Ortega calls alteración. The animal is always engaged in activity. It is always out among the things in his world.

[T]he animal is always alert. The ears of a horse in the field, like two live antennae, two periscopes, reveal in their restlessness the fact that the animal is always preoccupied with what lies around him. Look at the monkeys in their cage at the zoo. It is marvelous how these man-apes are into everything.⁵

This constant activity is totally a result of envi-

ronmentally and genetically given needs. "Its [the animal's] existence is nothing but the whole collection of its elemental, i. e., organic or biological, necessities and the actions which meet them. This is life in the organic or biological sense of the word."⁶

These biological necessities--the need for food, for warmth, for safety, etc.--Ortega calls "objective" needs, or the "objectively necessary." For the animal, the objectively necessary coincides with the subjectively necessary. It creates no needs for itself; its needs are all given to it: being is not a problem.

The animal, unlike the stone, is actively engaged in projects. But the projects are not of its choosing. They are always the given projects appropriate to its nature (i. e., the beaver building a dam--beavers always and everywhere engage in this project). It is this constant, fixed, but vital, nature that makes each tiger, for instance, a "first tiger." "[T]he tiger of today is neither more nor less a tiger than was that of a thousand years ago: it is being a tiger for the first time, it is always a first tiger."⁷ The nature of tiger-behavior is fixed from the coming of the species tiger to the-(lamentably)-soon-to-come extinction of the species. The same thing applies to each biological species. Each one represents a form of life completely given at its inception by the relation between the animal's innate needs and the envi-

ronment's capacity to meet them. There is, of course, an evolution of species from one into another, but there is no significant evolution within a species. As we will see when we discuss Ortega's theory of generations, man is an exception to this rule. Man's being is not his biological nature, but his life. What we have said here about animal species applies only to non-humans species.

The being of human life is of a very different character than that of the stone or the tiger. Man does, of course, have a chemical nature, like the stone, and he has biological needs, as does the tiger. Indeed, the life of primitive man is, perhaps, not so different from the life of the tiger. Such a man "lives alert on his own frontiers, looking toward the outside, absorbed in nature, attentive to the external."⁸ But even this is never quite true. The life of man is always more than what is given to him. Man wants more than bare biological necessities; he is a being who creates needs. Ortega illustrates this with the ancient practices of getting drunk, of inventing musical instruments, of building sweat-houses. "It seems that, from the very beginning, the concept of 'human necessity' compares indiscriminately what is objectively necessary and what is objectively superfluous."⁹

Man lives his life toward the future. His life is a task, a drama, something which is not given to him but which he must create. Man is thus an "autofabricator."¹⁰

This creation of his future is made both possible and necessary by four ingredients which human life has but which inanimate objects and other life forms lack. These are ensimismamiento, freedom, imagination and memory. We said in Chapter One that man had the ability to withdraw into himself and contemplate his situation. The animal cannot do this, for his environment is too threatening for him to ignore it for even a moment. (Perhaps for primitive man the situation does not allow ensimismamiento.)¹¹

When man contemplates his circumstances, he realizes that he can change them, that a plurality of actions are open to him. This is his freedom--no one choice is forced on him by his environment. His environment gives him only possibilities, not one single path that he must follow. It is his imagination which allows him to "picture" possible ways his future could be. This is the faculty which allows him to write the novel of himself.

What we have just described is approximately the internal situation of the first man who realized his freedom and decided to be himself, the legendary Prometheus. But it is not our situation. It is that of the first man who was more than his biologically given self. This mythical "first man" had the opportunity to formulate any program for himself and to invent any methods he could for achieving it. This is not our situation because

[T]he human individual is not putting on humanity for the first time. To begin with, he finds around him, in his 'circumstances,' other men and the society they give rise to. Hence his humanity, that which begins to develop in him, takes its point of departure from another, already developed, that has reached its culmination: in short, to his humanity he adds other humanities. He finds at birth a form of humanity, a mode of being a man, already forged, that he need not invent but may simply take over and set out from for his individual development. This does not begin for him--as for the tiger, which must always start again--at zero but at a positive quantity to which he adds his own growth. Man is not a first man, an eternal Adam; he is formally a second man, a third man, etc.¹²

This structure which humanity carries with it is culture; and its two principal ingredients are, according to Ortega, ideology and technology. Man's ability to accumulate ideas and tools is based on his ability to remember. This is why the animal has neither.¹³

Clearly both the ideology and the technology of any era are historical products, slowly accumulated through long periods of time. Because man never starts from zero in projecting into the future, but rather always takes off from an historical level of ideology and technology, his life, his being, is intrinsically historical.

Ortega's picture of the being of human life must be seen in three dimensions. One dimension consists of human life at a given time in a given place. If we looked only at this aspect, we could say that man does have a nature--that of a creature possessing freedom, always involved in projects, always deciding what to do next. But such a

creature could, conceivably, have a set of fixed limits on his behavior. And, indeed, in any given time and place, such a set of limits on what human life can be does exist. However, to bring in the second dimension, one can, in any given time, find radically different kinds of human living going on in different parts of the world. Ortega is especially impressed with the great differences between European and Asiatic man.¹⁴

The third, and by far the most important, dimension of human living is the one defined by the sequence of generations. Ortega conceives of the sequence of generations as a definite, finite sequence of life-forms beginning with the dawn of man.

The series of forms of human life that have existed are not, as a matter of fact, infinite--there are a certain number of them, as many as there are generations, a certain and precise and definite number of them which take each other's place one after another and grow one out of another like the figures in a kaleidoscope, forming...a melody of universal human destiny.¹⁵

The concept of generation is the most important idea in Ortega's philosophy of history.¹⁶ He sees the drama of human life as always involving three distinct groups--the young, the mature, and the old--living together in one society but representing three distinct eras. "In history it is important to distinguish between the state of coeval and that of being contemporary. Lodged together in a single external and chronological fragment

of time are three different and vital times."¹⁷ Each man is born into a generation and has no choice but to live within that generation. Belonging to a given generation is like traveling with "a caravan within which man moves a prisoner."¹⁸

The most important thing about the three coexisting generations--boys, mature men, old men--is their respective relation to that vital belief-structure within which all men live. The young people in a society spend the first twenty-five years of their lives assimilating the culture into which they are born, i. e., the culture as lived and believed by the mature men of that age.¹⁹ When this "young" generation reaches its maturity, it begins to put into action a new program for living, which will be different from that of the generation ahead of them. This is so because that generation has done something, has changed the world. The new mature generation will make its changes and then live to see them supplanted by still a newer generation of mature men, men in power. Thus history has an inexorable dimension of change, and the vehicle is the succession of the generations. "This is what I usually call the essential anachronism of history. Thanks to that internal disequilibrium, it moves, changes, wheels and flows."²⁰

Although Ortega believes there is a significant change made in the vital drama called human life with the coming of each new generation, he believes that the changes

are of two radically different types. Some generations feel a strong kinship with the vital structures they inherit and modify them in a way that emphasizes continuity. Others find the inherited culture alien and feel the need for radical and complete transformation of the life-style. "There are in fact some ages in which thought regards itself as growing out of seeds already sown and others which are conscious of the immediate past as of something in urgent need of radical reform."²¹

Remember that for Ortega the two principal ingredients of culture are ideology and technology, and that these two structures are what each generation inherits and modifies. In ages of crisis, it is one of these two structures which appears as in a state of collapse. The more important, for Ortega, is the belief-structure, the ideology. It is a hierarchical structure which is always based on a fundamental belief, such as faith in science for modern man, or faith in the Christian God for medieval man. It is when this fundamental belief breaks down that man finds himself in an epochal crisis. When this happens it is the mission of one key generation to create a new and viable belief-structure in which a new age can dwell. Ortega believes that (ca. 1921) we are in such a crisis now, and that the last such crisis was "solved" by the generation of Galileo.²²

Ortega's concept of the generation seems to be an

attempt to apply the theory of biological evolution to human history. The successive generations are conceived in analogy with the successive species in an evolutionary chain. As each species contains within its being all the species which came before it, "each human generation carries within itself all the previous generations, and appears like a foreshortening of universal history."²³ Each generation grows out of a previous one and into the next one as each species is a mutation of an older one and eventually produces another species by a new mutation. With generational evolution, as with biological evolution, there is a multiplicity of evolutionary chains. Just as bees and apes are on different chains, so for example, are Spaniards and Vietnamese. It is as if human life in any given society is a series of more or less successful mutations which occur every fifteen years or so. In addition to these "minor" mutations, there occur "major" or epochal mutations which reorient completely the thrust of human history in a period of crisis. These might be compared to "epochal" changes in evolution like the moving of a species from the sea to the land, or the coming of the first carnivores, or the first tool-makers.

This analogy between Ortega's theory of the generations and the theory of biological evolution is suggested by his intense interest in biology, his preoccupation with "vitalism," and the ways in which he speaks of the indivi-

dual generations in metaphors that suggest species. "If we consider the evolution of a race in its entirety we find that each of its generations appears as a moment in its vital process or as a pulse beat in its organic energy. And each pulse-beat has a peculiar, even unique physiognomy."²⁴ "A generation is a variety of the human race in the strict sense given to that term by the naturalists."²⁵ Now we see why, for Ortega, man is an exception to the rule that there can be no significant evolution within a biological species. Writing of members of the same generation Ortega says, "Each individual mysteriously recognizes all the rest of his collectivity, as the ants in each ant hill recognize each other by a peculiar pattern or odor."²⁶

Ortega states that the most dissimilar men belonging to the same generation are more similar than, say, men of the same profession living in different generations. This is analogous to saying that the most dissimilar pair of tigers are more alike than any pair made up of a tiger, and, say, a monkey. "The reactionary and the revolutionary of the nineteenth century are much nearer to one another than either is to any man of our own age. The fact is...the men of that generation belong to one species."²⁷

What Ortega is saying, then, when he says man has no nature but only a history is that man has not a nature, but a sequence of them (or many different sequences of

them in the different parts of the world). Perhaps we should say a major sequence of epochal natures and a minor sequence of generational ones. It is an axiom for Ortega that man must know where he has been in order to know where he should go next, for history constitutes a series of experiments, a storehouse of knowledge for man to draw on. The past is "man's authentic being...Man is what has happened to him, what he has done."²⁸ Moreover, the past is all he has as he faces the future.

[F]aced with a future which is not in his hands, he finds that the only thing he has, that he possesses, is his past. Of this alone can he make use; this is the small ship in which he sets sail toward the unquiet future that lies ahead.²⁹

When man fails to understand his past, he lives in a world of usages. These are behaviors which once had a living function but which are now simply dead relics. We observe them, but we do not know why. One of these is the salutation, or in our society, the handshake. The "etymology" of the handshake will be treated in Chapter Three as an example of the application of Ortega's method of historical reason.

Today man's technology is in danger of becoming a usage, something that man has but fails to understand.³⁰ When properly understood, technology is an historical entity. Man develops a technology in order to achieve certain goals (superfluous goals, remember,) which he has chosen. This technology is broader than mere gadgetry;

Ortega often mentions the technology of the Orient: meditation and other methods aimed at the goal of freeing the spirit. Western technology is mainly aimed at comfort, at making life less difficult, but any use of technology is only a means to an end. If we fail to understand these ends, then technology hangs about our necks like an albatross.

Man, of course, can deny the transcendental importance of his history. He can assert that each man is a first man, as each tiger is a first tiger. Ortega says it is typically Spanish to do this, and he calls this historical attitude "Adamism." It is an attitude to which rationalism is prone. It is the attitude of tearing down a system and trying to replace it completely with an imagined better one. Ortega claims that the rationalist philosopher is always found "in the centre of the revolutionary stage."³¹ Such revolutionary, anti-historical attitudes try to deny that man is basically historical; we cannot be but where we are, and can only go forward from that point with what we have learned from our history.

Thus Ortega is convinced that the being of "my life" is an historical being. My life contains its ancestry, its how-I-got-here, and the only way we can understand our being is to study that ancestry. We will never know what we are or what we should become until we discover our past. If we agree that history has such transcendental importance,

then we must find the best method for studying it.

Ortega tries to show that the usual methods of science are not applicable to history. What is needed is a new tool, which he thinks he has discovered and which he calls "historical reason." In the next chapter we will examine his reasons for rejecting the traditional methods of science for the study of history, and we will examine his formulation of the method of historical reason, illustrating how he uses it in analyzing the historical origins of the salutation.

FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER II

¹HAAS, p. 217.

²WIP, p. 211.

³HAAS, p. 111.

⁴MAC, p. 21. This description of the being of an intelligent stone seems to me an excellent description of B. F. Skinner's concept of man.

⁵WIP, p. 164. It should be noted that many of Ortega's ideas about animals he obtained by observing them in zoos. The dangers of drawing conclusions about how animals behave in their natural environment from their behavior in zoos have been forcefully pointed out by Konrad Lorenz, for example.

⁶HAAS, p. 93.

⁷HAAS, p. 220.

⁸WIP, p. 164.

⁹HAAS, p. 98.

¹⁰HAAS, p. 116.

¹¹There surely is a problem here. It would seem that house-pets ought to be capable of ensimismamiento, if the danger factor is really so important.

¹²HAAS, p. 220.

¹³See HAAS, pp. 136-7. This is not to say that animals never use any tools, but rather, that they have no social, passed-on technology.

¹⁴See, for instance, HAAS, pp. 122-129, and TMT, pp. 64-65, where Ortega discussed Buddhism.

¹⁵MAC, p. 122.

¹⁶After completing the first draft of this dissertation, I became familiar with Julián Marías' recent book Generations. Translated by Harold C. Raley (University, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1970). Ortega's theory of generation as presented by Marías contains all the weaknesses and defects which are found in the theory as I have presented it. The main difference is that Marías finds the theory stimulating and true while I find it false and even self-contradictory.

¹⁷WIP, p. 34.

¹⁸MAC, p. 44.

¹⁹For a program of how this transmission of culture should be carried out, see Ortega's Mission of the University. Translated by Howard Lee Nostrand (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1966).

²⁰MAC, p. 43.

²¹TMT, p. 12.

²²See Man and Crisis, which in Spanish is En Torno a Galileo.

²³MAC, p. 53.

²⁴TMT, p. 16.

²⁵TMT, p. 15.

²⁶MAC, p. 45.

²⁷TMT, p. 15.

²⁸HAAS, p. 216.

²⁹MAC, p. 120.

³⁰Ortega's famous The Revolt of the Masses is largely about the danger of man's cutting himself off from his past and from the roots of his technology.

³¹TMT, p. 131.

CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL REASON

Ortega's concept of "historical reason" must be seen in two different but complementary lights. First, he contrasts historical reason, or "vital reason," with rationalism. Second, he considers historical reason as a method, and contrasts it with the method of physics.

Ortega asserts that since the time of Galileo and Descartes, European man has lived in a faith in reason. (Ortega uses a variety of names for the type of reason which he is contrasting with historical reason. "Pure reason," "physical reason," "physio-mathematical reason," and "abstract reason" are the ones he uses most frequently.) This belief in physical reason has been the fundamental belief of European man, but it is collapsing. The belief in reason led to the flourishing of science, and that science which has served us so well is in danger. "Science is in danger...this same science, once a living social faith, is now almost looked down upon by society in general."¹

The faith which western man placed in science is exhausted. Man needs a new fundamental truth, "a new revelation,"² to replace the faith in science, or in physical reason. Physical reason acquired its prestige and

its position as a fundamental belief because of the great success of physics, culminating in the brilliant, comprehensive synthesis of Newton. Men came to believe, as Descartes believed, that physical reason would open all doors of knowledge. "The world that surrounds man...is to become transparent, even to its farthest recesses, to the human mind. At last man is to know the truth about everything."³ This faith spawned by physics spilled over to biology, and the social sciences attempted to apply the methods of physical reason to the study of man's life.

Why has the faith in physical reason failed? Surely not because physics has failed, but rather because only physics among the sciences has succeeded. Physics has succeeded so well that not only does it give us precise knowledge about matter, it also has discovered its own foundation and clearly articulated its limits. This has been made possible by the supplanting of the Newtonian world by the world of Einstein. We now know that "Einstein's physics may give way to another, the quantum theory be followed by other theories, the electron conception of the structure of matter by other conceptions."⁴

Physics has shown itself not to be a revelation of reality, but rather a human construction which has consequences which agree with certain phenomena and which has great practical utility. The knowledge of physics is always symbolic and imagined; it is doxa, never epistēmē.

So the hope of Descartes that physical reason would reveal reality to us turns out to be just that: a hope.

What Ortega thinks has been supplanted is the "terrorism of the laboratories."⁵ Until our century, the "experimental method" was not only seen as the way to all the truth, but also it was seen as the only way to truth. What has happened, and is still happening, is the retreating of each science into its own proper sphere. Without mentioning his name, Ortega apparently thinks we are returning to a conception of the division of the sciences similar to that held by Aristotle. This means each science studies a portion of reality with a method dictated by the kind of being it studies, and that each science is autonomous from all the others. This is why Ortega is so fascinated by the attempt of the intuitionist philosophers of mathematics to free mathematics from logic.

[W]e are now living through one of the greatest and most glorious battles of the intellect which has ever taken place; this with modern physics will, in the long parade of the years, render our day noble. I refer to the attempt made by Brouwer and Weyl to demonstrate the partial discrepancy between the consistency of numbers and that of concepts; therefore, the impossibility of a logical or formalist mathematics, and the necessity of a mathematics which is faithful to the peculiarity of its object which they call 'intuitionist', a mathematics which would not be logical, but strictly mathematical.⁶

The following quote shows that Ortega sees this as representing a trend among all the sciences.

The sciences are now dominated by a trend which is diametrically opposed to that obtaining toward the end of the nineteenth century. At that time one science or another tried to rule the rest, to extend its own domestic method over them, and the rest humbly tolerated this invasion. Now each science not only accepts its native defects but repels every pretense that another can make laws for it.⁷

If this division of the sciences were to be accepted, then history, if it is a science, would automatically have its field of study and it would have to develop a method appropriate to its subject matter. But many scientists have stubbornly maintained that eventually man's life will be explained completely by biology, or physics, or psychology. The key word here is "eventually." This putting off of solutions into a far future is a vice which Ortega calls "uchronianism," in analogy with Utopianism. He relates an example from biology to make his point.

Many years ago I was reading a lecture of the physiologist Loeb on tropism, a concept by means of which it was thought possible to describe and explain the law which regulates the elemental movements of infusoria... [A]t the end of his lecture Loeb adds: 'the time will come when what we call today the moral acts of man will be explained simply as tropisms.' This piece of audacity shocked me extremely, for it opened my eyes to many other opinions of modern science which make, with less ostentation, the same mistake. So then, I thought, such a concept as tropism, which is scarcely capable of penetrating the secret of phenomena so simple as the transference of infusoria, can be thought sufficient, in some vague future, to explain so mysterious and complex a thing as the ethical acts of man. What sense can there be in this? Science has to solve its problems today, not put us off to the Greek kalends.⁸

The importance of "uchronianism," or putting us off to the Greek kalends, in Ortega's thought cannot be overestimated. He says himself twenty years after the above passage was written, "From this idea of the Greek kalends all my philosophical thought has emanated."⁹ Of course he means opposition to the Greek kalends.

The problem with all uchronianisms is that man needs knowledge now. Physical reason seems only to work on problems about nature. These are, thinks Ortega, secondary problems. Man needs to know what to do next. For this he needs to know on what he can rely and most of all, he needs knowledge of himself, which is to say, he needs to know his history. Thus history, not physics, should be the primary science.

We need a science of history, but Ortega is convinced that such a science must use completely different methods than those used in physics. When the methods of physical science are used to study man, they tell us nothing about man's life. In regard to history, Ortega says "where great human changes are concerned science...has got nothing exact to say."¹⁰

The reasons for the failure of physical reason to cope with the phenomenon of human life and how it changes have to do with the structure of physical reason itself. What physical reason or natural science does is to reveal the nature of the things it studies.¹¹ As we saw in Chap-

ter Two, stones, for instance, have such a nature. Now "when naturalist reason studies man it seeks, in consistency with itself, to reveal his nature."¹² But for Ortega man has no nature--only a history. So this method of revealing a nature can never find man's life. It can study his body's chemical make-up, his animal needs, his psyche. But because man has no nature, "we know that all the marvels of the natural sciences...must always come to a full stop before the strange reality of human life."¹³

So far, we have attributed to Ortega (or he has attributed to himself) a very old theory of science. There is, however, a much more contemporary view of physical science contained in his work.¹⁴ In this view, Ortega says that physical science is made of two parts: (1) construction of an imagined world which has certain observable consequences and (2) careful observations to see if the derived "facts" agree with the observed facts. There is no inductivist thinking here, no notion that observation precedes theory. Now conceived in this way, why is physical reason not modifiable so as to make constructions, deductions, and tests using historical data? Why does the fact that man has no nature preclude such a procedure? Ortega does not answer these questions. Instead, he attributes to physical reason additional qualities which do make it inappropriate as a tool for studying history. "Scientific truth is characterized by its

exactness and the certainty of its predictions."¹⁵ Historical predictions can never have this exact, certain character, because man is free and spontaneous. We are never sure just exactly what he will do next. This is his spontaneity. "The expression most fragrant with the scent of life...is to my mind the word 'incitement.' It has no meaning except in the disciplines of life."¹⁶ I do not mean to suggest that man's freedom consists in our ignorance of what he may do next. Man's freedom consists in his ability to be in a state in which he has not decided what he is going to do. Not only do those observing him not know what he will do, it is impossible to know; it simply has not been decided yet. The situation is truly indeterminant.¹⁷

If we grant, for any or all the reasons that Ortega has proposed, that the methods of physical science are not applicable to history, and that history is both possible and necessary as a science, what sort of method must be developed for its study? Or, perhaps the Hegelian "sciences of the spirit" have already developed such a method. Emphatically they have not, thinks Ortega.¹⁸ The task of developing a "historical reason" is still to be accomplished, though Ortega believes he ~~has~~ at least begun the task.

What must be done is to vitalize reason, to make it historical. We must not impose a structure on history,

but, on the contrary, find within history "its original, autochthonous reason."¹⁹ The purpose in understanding history is two-fold: we want an accurate revivifying, a making-present of where we have been, and an ability to prophesy where we are going.

Physical reason succeeds if it gives us the mechanical causes of an event or discloses the essence or nature of a thing. Historical reason succeeds in explaining the being of a man or of a society if it narrates accurately what that man or that society has been.

Alongside pure physio-mathematical reason there is, then, a narrative reason. To comprehend anything human, be it personal or collective, one must tell its history. This man, this nation, does such a thing and is in such a manner because formerly he or it did that other thing and was in such another manner.²⁰

Historical reason, then, is narration, at least initially. But this does not mean for Ortega that each man and each nation has its own "story" and that is all there is to it. If this were true, we would hardly be discussing any science of history. Although the history of any man or nation could be different from what it in fact is, there are structures in history common to all societies. History has rhythms and laws of development. Ortega's assertion about historical laws of development is one of the main reasons I label him a "historicist." We will consider in some detail his analysis of a particular phenomenon according to historical reason as narra-

tion. He calls such analyses "etymologies," and sometimes suggests that this is all that historical reason means. "'Etymology' is the concrete name for what is usually and abstractly called 'historical reason.'"²¹ We will examine this etymological historical reason with Ortega's example of the salutation. Then we will examine two of Ortega's "laws of history"--the progression of the generations as it operates in historical crises, and the law of growth and decline of civilizations.

The past is always with us, either as living knowledge or as dead usage. A usage, for Ortega, is a behavior that once had a living function but which now is performed in a mechanical, perfunctory way. Such usages are with us all the time. One example is the handshake. We do not shake hands because we really want to, but because it is what "one does."²² When historical reason confronts a dead usage like the handshake, its purpose is to discover the lost living function which the handshake once had, to trace the etymology of handshaking.

In order to understand handshaking, Ortega urges us to proceed as follows:

[E]ach one of us shall for the moment thoroughly consider what happens to him, and only to him, when he executes a salutation...The thing is to avoid making hypotheses, suppositions, plausible as they may seem, and to devote ourselves to contemplating just what happens to us ...when we execute a salutation. Only this radical method can save us from error.²³

Ortega then gives us the results of his reflections on his own handshaking. He finds three constructive elements: first, "It comes to me from outside of myself;"²⁴ second, "I...do not execute it of my own spontaneous will;"²⁵ and third, "I do not even understand it."²⁶ The handshaking seems clearly to be something outside myself. I do not think of it; I do not will it; and when I do it, I do not understand it.

Ortega thinks that the only way a man would perform an action he did not will and did not understand, would be under a compulsion. Who compels the action? "There is no doubt about the answer. It is usage."²⁷ That is, society, for Ortega believes that society is "a gigantic architecture of usages."²⁸ Usages are characterized by the fact that they once were "inter-individual and intelligible human actions, actions with a soul which were then drained of meaning."²⁹ In order to recover their meaning, to give them meaning for us, we must use historical reason to do the following:

[I]f we reconstruct the history of the act and look at the series of its earlier forms, we come to certain forms that had a complete and rational meaning for those who used them and have it even for us if, by an effort of imagination, we transport ourselves into very ancient human situations. Once we have found the earlier form that we can understand, all the subsequent forms, down to our residual one, automatically acquire meaning for us.³⁰

Ortega, then, uses his imagination and discovers that the original act of salutation was a way of handling

the very threatening situation of two men approaching each other. Man "was once a wild beast,"³¹ and the act of two men approaching each other "was until quite recently a dangerous and difficult operation."³² To cope with this, the salutation was invented.

Ortega thinks that the less complicated a society is, that is the less usages it has developed, the more formal and complicated the salutation will be. He uses the example of the African Tuareg, whose salutation "began a hundred yards from his neighbor, was a most complicated ceremonial, and lasted half an hour."³³ Our handshake is the dead remnant of this once important, living action. Ortega predicts that in England, which he considers the most advanced nation, the handshake will die out altogether.

This etymology of the handshake is clever, inventive, and perhaps even true. It is important to notice how Ortega developed his analysis. First, and we did not consider this, he examined and rejected a theory of the handshake developed by Herbert Spencer. Then he made a supposedly pure observation of his own act of handshaking, which showed him that the handshake was a usage, and which yielded its three essential qualities. Then he imagined the situation in which it was a rational, living kind of behavior. Lastly, he found several examples of primitive tribes whose complicated salutation seemed to confirm

what his imagination suggested. This is, I think, a fair summary of how Ortega wishes to apply historical reason to the study of etymologies. The important point for us is that he feels he is not using the same method that the natural scientists use.

If "historical reason" meant no more than the systematic analysis of usages, who could quarrel with it? Surely it is both interesting and important to understand why we do the socially given actions which all of us perform. Although Ortega sometimes says he only means the study of etymologies when he uses the term historical reason, at other times he seems to mean a great deal more by it. Recall that Ortega wants the historian to prophesy, to tell us about the coming age. "History has room for prophecy. And more than this: the labor of history is only scientific in proportion to the place that prophecy can occupy in it."³⁴ This does not mean that particular events are predictable, but that the character of a whole coming period is predictable. History is "subject to the operation of a law of development."³⁵ The present age always contains within it seeds of the age to come. How does historical reason find these seeds and then forecast the future?

Ortega believes that in any given era, there is a select minority in a society that is ahead of its time. It is always the mission of this minority to lead the

masses in both action and thought.³⁶ He thinks we can find clues to the future if we look at what the members of the elect minority are thinking.

It is in the realm of pure thought, therefore that the earliest faint signs of the coming age can be traced....The science of today is the magic vessel into which we have to look to obtain a glimmering of the future...On what men are beginning to think today depends how they will live in the market-places tomorrow.³⁷

This is why Ortega thinks the work of Einstein has such momentous significance. (His own theory of perspectivism was heavily influenced by it.)

A cataclysmic revolution in thought suggests a subsequent cataclysmic change in human life. But this does not mean that what we look for is an isolated genius to revolutionize thought. Ortega firmly believes that only generations of thinkers make changes, not individual thinkers. If the times are not right, the thinker's work will be ignored. The world was ready for Copernicus; it was not ready for Aristarchus.³⁸

Ortega wants to make the generation a rigorous tool of historical analysis. Since we are living in a crisis period, the end of the modern world, he urges us to return with him to the last great crisis of western man, the one "solved" by Galileo and Descartes, and see how the method of generations applies to it.

First we must observe that Ortega fixes the length of a generation at fifteen years. He arrives at this pre-

cise number in the following way. Man's life is divided into three main parts: youth, or the period of assimilation of culture; maturity, or the period of domination; and old age. Youth is the time from birth to age thirty; maturity from thirty to sixty; and old age the period after sixty. He describes the first two periods (the only really important ones for his theory) as follows:

In the first period man acquaints himself with the world into which he has fallen...this is childhood and all that part of bodily youth which reaches to the thirties. At this age, man begins to react on his own account against the world he has found; he invents new ideas about the world's problems--science, technology, religion, politics, industry, art, social customs. He himself, and others, make propaganda out of all that innovation, just as, vice versa, they integrate their creations with those of their coevals who, like them, are obliged to react against the world they found. And thus, one fine day, they find themselves with their world made over; the world which is their work has become the world in force.... Man upholds a world which he has produced, he directs it, governs it, defends it. He defends it because some new men of thirty begin in their turn to react against this new ruling order.³⁹

The men from thirty to sixty are the ones who make history. "The boy and the old man hardly intervene in history; the former not yet, the latter no longer."⁴⁰

"[A]t any given moment historic reality is composed of the lives of men between thirty and sixty."⁴¹ But these men do not constitute a generation. They make up precisely two generations of equal length. In art, politics, science, etc., a man develops and fights for his ideas from

thirty to forty-five, and enjoys seeing them become dominant while he is between forty-five and sixty. Thus Ortega is led to say that a generation is fifteen years long and that life is divided into five, not three stages.

[M]an's life is divided into five stages of about fifteen years each--childhood, youth, initiation, dominance, and old age. The truly historic stage is found in the two mature ages --initiation and dominance. Hence I would say that an historic generation lives fifteen years of gestation and fifteen years of creation.⁴²

If we accept this division and also Ortega's view that a generation is not a date but a zone of dates, and that generations do not blur into each other, but progress like the distinct frames of a movie or notes of a melody, then how do we determine to which generation a particular person belongs? Normally, this is quite difficult, but at one particular time, namely the time of the solution to a great epochal crisis, the generation dates can be fixed precisely. The procedure is as follows. Each epoch is based on "certain principles of life which were defined for the first time at a certain date."⁴³ This was done by a particular generation, which is called the decisive generation. In order to isolate just which generation this was, find "the figure who most clearly represents the character of the period."⁴⁴ In the case of the birth of the modern or rational age, Ortega thinks there is no doubt that that man is Descartes. The key date is the thirtieth year of that key figure's

life. So for the modern age, the year is 1626. "That will be the key date in Descartes' generation, a point of departure from which others can be fixed on either side merely by adding or subtracting groups of fifteen years."⁴⁵ Thus 1611, 1596, 1581, etc., and 1641, 1656, 1671, etc., mark out for us the sequence of the generations.

Establishing precisely the sequence of generations up to our own day is what the science of history should be doing. In addition, the historian as prophet should be looking for the first generation which is no longer "modern," which is completely comfortable in a post-modern thought pattern. When the historian discerns the character of this generation's thought, he will be able to give us the outlines of the next epoch of western man.

Another aspect of historical reason which I wish to consider is Ortega's contention that whole societies, not just the individuals within them, have a childhood, a period of maturity, and an old age. These represent three stages in the psyche of man: the traditional state, the rationalist state and the mystical state. "These are ---the three distinct ways in which the mental apparatus of mankind pursues its function."⁴⁶

In the traditionalist epoch, "The individual invariably adapts his reactions to a communal repertory which he has received by transmission from a venerated past...the situation is identical, in this respect with

that prevailing in the mind of the child."⁴⁷ The rationalist state is governed by belief in pure reason. Ortega argues at length that the faith in pure reason with its accompanying disdain for history leads to radicalism and revolution. The failure of both pure reason and revolutions leads to the mystical stage, which is the stage of decadence. "The post-revolutionary epochs, after a very fugitive hour of apparent splendor, settle into a time of decadence."⁴⁸ Then man turns to superstition, finds a new religion to rely on, and the cycle begins again with a new traditionalist age.

These examples of the generation in history and invariable cycles of development should be sufficient to make it clear that Ortega believes in laws of history. Although he is not a determinist, he believes in grand historical trends and epochs. It is this kind of logic of history, this non-particular, non-etymological component in his concept of historical reason which will be criticized later in this dissertation.

CHAPTER III, FOOTNOTES

¹HAAS, pp. 177-8.

²HAAS, p. 223.

³HAAS, p. 170.

⁴HAAS, pp. 228-9.

⁵WIP, p. 46.

⁶WIP, p. 88.

⁷WIP, p. 59.

⁸TMT, p. 146. The Greeks did not calculate time by kalends; the Romans did. So one who owed money often said he would pay at the Greek kalends, which meant, of course, he would never pay.

⁹HAAS, p. 181.

¹⁰HAAS, p. 178.

¹¹See especially pp. 184-5 of HAAS. I utterly disagree with this. Much of my criticism of Ortega will be based on what I see to be a serious misunderstanding of science.

¹²HAAS, p. 184.

¹³HAAS, p. 185.

¹⁴I am not at all sure that these two views are compatible.

¹⁵HAAS, p. 13.

¹⁶HAAS, p. 21.

¹⁷For an excellent study of Ortega's concept of human freedom see William Kilgore, "Freedom in the Perspectivism of Ortega," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXXII, No. 4 (June, 1972), 500-513.

¹⁸See HAAS, pp. 187-199.

¹⁹HAAS, p. 231.

²⁰HAAS, p. 214.

²¹MAP, p. 203.

²²Readers familiar with Heidegger will immediately notice that Ortega's world of usages is closely akin to Heidegger's world of inauthentic behavior.

²³MAP, p. 186.

²⁴MAP, p. 187.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Ibid. Ortega immediately attributes the three characteristics just enumerated to each person's salutation, not just his own.

²⁷MAP, p. 190.

²⁸MAP, p. 221.

²⁹MAP, p. 198.

³⁰MAP, p. 202.

³¹MAP, p. 207.

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid.

³⁴TMT, p. 22.

³⁵TMT, p. 23.

³⁶The disastrous consequences of the masses attempting to lead is the theme of Ortega's The Revolt of the Masses.

³⁷TMT, pp. 26-7.

³⁸Ortega is hardly being very original here. William James gave an excellent account of the relation between historical change and men of genius in his "Great Men and Their Environment," in The Will to Believe (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1937). James' theory is, in my view, more modern and much more defensible than Ortega's even though it first appeared in 1880.

³⁹MAC, pp. 55-6.

⁴⁰MAC, p. 56.

⁴¹MAC, p. 57.

⁴²MAC, p. 60.

⁴³MAC, p. 62.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵MAC, p. 63.

⁴⁶TMT, p. 103.

⁴⁷TMT, p. 105.

⁴⁸TMT, p. 132.

CHAPTER IV

SOME CONTRADICTIONS IN ORTEGA'S SYSTEM

In this chapter I want to consider several inconsistencies in Ortega's philosophy. Some of these are within his philosophy of history, while others involve something he asserts about history and a contradictory assertion from another part of his overall philosophy. It is always a somewhat risky business, this accusing a philosopher of contradicting himself. The possibility always exists that the accuser has misunderstood the philosopher. Ortega often accuses his readers of misunderstanding him. However, I agree with Felix Alluntis, who writes:

One of the favorite arguments of those devoted to Ortega against those who criticize his ideas is that he has not been understood ...Nevertheless, I warn the reader that Ortega is understood easily; if there are in his works concepts which are unintelligible, it is easy to understand that they are unintelligible. This conclusion is not based upon any extrinsic reason, like that which denies philosophical depth to Ortega's books because they are translated by women, but rather upon the reading of the books themselves: Ortega's ideas are not excessively deep; besides, he is a master of clear and artistic expression.¹

The first inconsistency to be considered concerns the simultaneous necessity and impossibility of understanding all of history. Many times Ortega tells us that we can only understand an age if we know all the preceding

ages. "One age cannot be understood if all the others are not understood."² "[H]istory cannot be recounted excepting in its entirety."³ "[N]othing can be truly clear in history until everything is clear..."⁴

He asserts that this task of recounting all of history can be done by using historical reason correctly. "The historian has all the data in his hands, all the details of the integrating process out of which he is going to derive history from its beginning to its end."⁵ This, of course, does not mean that the complete reconstruction of the past is easy, but rather that it exists in "hieroglyphic" form in artifacts, documents and dead usages, each of which must be "deciphered" and given again its living meaning.

This notion that we must know everything in history before we know anything dooms history to failure, and it is one of Ortega's own doctrines which does the damage, for the perspectivist theory insures that any era will be utterly blind to certain truths. Recall from Chapter One, that each age has its "net" by which it admits some truths and utterly misses all the rest. Thus some previous eras will be transparent to us and the others will be opaque. All we can get is a view of history, not history itself. Following Ortega's own logic: if nothing is clear in history until everything is, and if at least some things in history are unclear because they are unknown, then nothing

in history is ever clear. Perhaps Ortega would accept this conclusion and thus avoid the contradiction, but if so, his grandiose plans for a science of history would certainly be in a difficult way. He could, of course, argue that it will take a long time, many generations, to build up our understanding of the whole past, but then it would be Ortega, and not science, putting us off to the Greek kalends. Surely he could not take this way out.

As to the alleged fact that the historian has in his hands all the data to construct our entire past, this again is contradicted by Ortega's own writings. Much of our history is preserved in vestigial form in our usages. But usages die out, and up to now, historians have not followed Ortega's principles and therefore have not kept catalogues of past usages which exist no longer. Could we really ever discover, for instance, all the usages and thus all the history of, say, the Sumerians? Clearly we could not. And we must find them if we are to know all our history, for the Sumerians, the Greeks, the Jews, etc., all form important, although perhaps unknowable, parts of our past.

The basic problem with Ortega's optimism about the past is that the past gets lost, although he could be saying that our past consists only of those events whose vestiges remain with us in the present. But this seems improbable, because part of how we got to our present state

involves events whose history is lost. I think, rather, that Ortega is making another questionable analogy between history and biological evolution. In a sense, any animal carries within itself its entire evolutionary heritage. This is made particularly graphic in the various stages of the human foetus, wherein the major stages of human evolution appear to be repeated. Man's history simply is not like that. Vital records, stories, descriptions, get lost in wars, in fires, in floods, and in other catastrophes. It is one thing to plead for a basic human right to continuity, a right to learn from one's history, as Ortega does--and should--plead. It is quite another to say the past cannot be destroyed, that it will always survive. This is deriving is from ought. The past should be with us as a guide to the future. It is, indeed, a precious storehouse of experiments in human living. But men forget, records are lost, and lessons are often ignored. We cannot, no matter what geniuses of imagination we may be, ever recover, for instance, the eighty-two lost plays of Sophocles. They are gone, and gone forever.

The second inconsistency concerns the alleged inappropriateness of the methods of physical science for the study of history. We have seen how Ortega thinks the exact and mathematical methods of the physical sciences cannot work in history because history is about man's life, which is always free and spontaneous. Ortega emphatically

states that "historical material has basically nothing to do with mathematics."⁶ And yet, the fundamental concept of his philosophy of history, the concept of the generation, involves an exact mathematical progression of stages, each lasting precisely fifteen years.

In Chapter Three it was pointed out how Ortega picked the date 1626 as the one for determining generations in the modern period. Then the nearby generations were "discovered" by merely adding or subtracting multiples of fifteen. This seems to me to be in blatant contradiction to such statements as "it is not by putting our trust in strict mathematical chronology that we can fix ages,"⁷ or that mathematics has "laid waste the spirit of life."⁸ This sequence of precise fifteen-year generations does not constitute a discovery of history's "own autochthonous reason." It is, instead, an arbitrary imposition of a mathematical formula on the historical process. The precision of Ortega's historical sequence of generations is not, as he admits, the precision of physical science. But neither is it the precision of some new historical science. It is rather the pseudo-precision of a pseudo-science like astrology.⁹

An inconsistency closely related to the previous one involves the use of the generation concept to relate men living in different countries. For instance, Ortega determines that Descartes and Hobbes are one generation

apart, and the fact that Hobbes is eight years older suggests this (eight being more than one-half of a generation). It is, to be sure, not the mathematics that determines this; it is rather a comparison of the respective thoughts of the two men. But Descartes was a Frenchman and Hobbes an Englishman, and Ortega states that continental Europe has "since the time of Alcuin...been about fifty years behind the English."¹⁰ This would suggest that Hobbes should have been way ahead of Descartes and that the rationalist era should have started in England. Another historical pair, Parmenides and Heraclitus, are alleged by Ortega to be of the same generation.¹¹ He states that they were both born about 520 B. C.¹² Many scholars think this is false, that Heraclitus was about twenty-five years older than Parmenides.¹³ Whatever the truth about their births may be, they lived and worked in different parts of the world, Heraclitus in Ionia, and Parmenides in southern Italy. Surely the identical generational sequences would not be operative at such distances in a time of such poor communication. Also, Ortega shifts his ground in this case when he asserts that "a discussion on the chronological relationships between the lives of both is not relevant here. What is crucial for us--and striking--is that the works of both were simultaneous and occurred about 475."¹⁴

Whether his dates are right on this is also not clear. What matters to us is that he seems to be opening

the way for men to shift generations. Now, it seems, it is not when you were born, but when you were published that determines to what generation you belong. My main point here, however, is the lack of clarity about generational sequences in different countries. Ortega is not decisive about this at all, sometimes saying each nation has its own unique sequence, other times implying that within Europe, for instance, all the nations go through the same cycle but with some ahead of others.

The fourth inconsistency involves the possibility of historical prophecies. Ortega states that history is scientific only if it can prophesy and that historical prophecy is possible.

It is false to say that history cannot be foretold. Numberless times this has been done... The idea that the historian is on the reverse side of a prophet sums up the whole philosophy of history.¹⁵

He further asserts that the present age of crisis and revolt of the masses was predicted by Hegel and Nietzsche.¹⁶ Moreover, he is convinced that "man is able to predict more and more of the future, and...has also attained greater possession of his past."¹⁷ I doubt that anyone would dispute that, especially with recent archaeological discoveries, we do in fact know more of the past. And Ortega often argues that our knowledge of the past narrows our future, making successful predictions more probable. "When historical thought matures the capacity

to forecast augments with it."¹⁸ The reason for this is that when man understands his past, he avoids repeating the errors already lived through. "The experiments already made with life narrow man's future. If we do not know what he is going to be, we know what he is not going to be."¹⁹

On the other hand, he asserts that in our era, there has been a great increase in possibilities for man's future.

[O]ur life as a programme of possibilities is magnificent, exuberant, superior to all others known to history. But by the very fact that its scope is greater, it has overflowed all the channels, principles, norms, ideals handed down by tradition. It is more problematical. It can find no direction from the past.²⁰

So while the past narrows our future in the sense of telling us what to avoid, there is a more than offsetting increase in possibilities, mainly due to the explosion of technology, which, on balance, would seem to make successful prophecy much less likely, rather than more likely.

The great increase in scientific knowledge also negates Ortega's own view of such knowledge as the "magic vessel" by which we can predict the future. He feels that scientific knowledge is now so specialized that each scientist is now a "learned ignoramus."²¹ This vast increase in specialization makes it much more difficult for anyone, especially the non-scientist historian, to understand what is going on in science. Yet the historian must do this if

he is to predict the future. So, for several reasons, it seems that Ortega asserts that prophecy is now both more and less probable.²²

Closely related to the problem of prophecy is an inconsistency concerning the roles of freedom and destiny in Ortega's philosophy. Throughout his work, he asserts that man is free. This freedom is limited, however, not absolute. Man must always choose among a given set of possibilities arising out of the past, which imposes several possible futures, or trajectories, among which we must choose. "[A]mong these possibilities I must choose. Hence, I am free."²³ Thus, although the past limits our future, it does not determine it. This given set of possibilities is our destiny, it is the "trap" into which we have been thrown. But "this trap does not strangle us, but leaves to life a margin of decision and always permits us, out of the imposed situation, to achieve an elegant solution and to forge for ourselves a beautiful life."²⁴ This is human spontaneity and creativity, which Ortega so often lauds and defends. Yet he is misleading us, for elsewhere he says that this feeling that the future can be many different things is really based on an illusion. We are free, it is true, but our only freedom is the freedom to choose between success and failure. Ortega believes that for each individual and for each generation there is only one correct choice, which is the authentic mission or vocation

of that man or that generation.

Those diverse projects or programs of life which our fancy elaborates, and among which our will...can freely choose, are not presented to us looking all alike; a strange voice emerging from some intimate and secret depths of our own calls on us to choose one of these and to bar the others... [A]mong his various possible beings each man always finds one which is his genuine and authentic being. The voice which calls him to that authentic being is what we call 'vocation'... [T]he only man who lives his own self, who truly lives, is the man who lives his vocation, whose life is in agreement with his own true self.²⁵

This does not apply only to individuals, for "each generation has its special vocation, its historical mission."²⁶

The result of this doctrine of mission, or true self, is that although our life is not determined, it ought to be.

Thus our freedom reduces to the freedom to be a failure.

And, indeed, Ortega accepts this.

[G]enerations, like individuals, sometimes fail in their vocation and leave their mission unachieved...it is obvious that such a dereliction of historical duty cannot go unpunished. The guilty generation drags out its existence in perpetual division against itself, its essential life shattered.²⁷

When Ortega is arguing this way, that the past imposes only one true trajectory, we can see how he can believe in historical prophecy. For all one would need to do is determine what the true trajectory was and what the consequences of ignoring it would be, and then the possibilities for the future would be reduced to two.

As we carry within ourselves a 'vocation' which is in great part common to all of us, which cor-

responds to the fact of our being contemporaries, we would only have to know how to listen to its voice and not alter it in order to be able to prophesy what the general lines of the future are going to be.²⁸

The notion of "mission" may not formally contradict the notion of multiple possible futures, but at least Ortega is severely misleading his readers when he says the past does not determine the future and that we are forced to choose our future from among many possible ones. Creative spontaneity and the existence of only one best choice are incompatible concepts.²⁹

I do not wish to make too much of these internal inconsistencies in Ortega's philosophy of history. The criticisms which will be offered in Chapters Six and Seven would still have force even if the inconsistencies could be resolved. And, indeed, some of them may be only apparent. For instance, perhaps Ortega feels that history is never lost, that it is stored in something like Jung's collective unconscious. Then deep reflection might disclose any desired aspect of the shared racial memory. But if Ortega believes this, he has never, to my knowledge, said so. Perhaps, also, he does not mean to be exact and mathematical when he fixes the length of a generation at fifteen years. I can only evaluate what he says and hope I understand what he means.

Having presented Ortega's overall philosophy of history and having pointed out some of its internal problems,

I wish to criticize his notion of historical reason from a methodological point of view. The type of criticism I will make is based on the writings of Karl R. Popper, and I think it important to make a slight detour at this point and look at how Popper develops his arguments against historicism. This will be done in the next chapter. Then in Chapter Six, the machinery will be used on Ortega's particular brand of historicism.

CHAPTER IV, FOOTNOTES

¹Felix Alluntis. "The Vital and Historical Reason of José Ortega y Gasset," Franciscan Studies, XV (1955), 61.

²MAC, p. 122.

³MAC, p. 184.

⁴HAAS, p. 221.

⁵MAC, p. 177.

⁶MAC, p. 15.

⁷MAC, p. 47.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ortega, of course, needs some device for separating generations, or he would be faced with a situation in which historical changes were continuous, and where thousands of minor happenings brought new thought patterns gradually into existence. This would make it impossible ever to know all of history.

¹⁰HAAS, p. 62.

¹¹See his The Origin of Philosophy. Translated by Toby Talbot (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1967), p. 79.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Windelband, for instance.

¹⁴The Origin of Philosophy, p. 79.

¹⁵TROTM, p. 54.

¹⁶Ibid. This assertion that the correct prediction of certain events in history by some people implies the scientific predictability of the future seems to me to be a serious, though common, error. There has seldom, if ever, been a horse race that someone has not predicted correctly. This does not make horse races predictable.

¹⁷The Origin of Philosophy, p. 31.

¹⁸TMT, p. 24.

¹⁹HAAS, p. 217. This is surely a dubious claim. Historical "mistakes" are repeated lamentably often.

²⁰TROTM, p. 47.

²¹TROTM, p. 112.

²²Ortega's own record as a prophet is, on the whole, rather impressive. Some of his prophecies will be examined in Chapter Eight.

²³HAAS, p. 203.

²⁴WIP, p. 248.

²⁵MAC, p. 180.

²⁶TMT, p. 19.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸MAC, p. 183.

²⁹This incompatibility is treated at length in Christian Cepolecha's excellent, scholarly work, The Historical Thought of José Ortega y Gasset (New Haven, Connecticut: The Yale University Press, 1957).

CHAPTER V

K. R. POPPER'S CRITIQUE OF HISTORICISM

K. R. Popper, like Ortega, attributes great philosophical significance to the work of Einstein. Unlike Ortega, however, he does not find this importance in the content of Einstein's theories, but rather in the fact that they overthrew and superseded the work of Newton. Einstein "taught us that Newton's theory may well be mistaken in spite of its overwhelming success."¹

The lesson we should learn from this is that no theory, no matter how subjectively certain we are of its truth, is secure. All our knowledge "is guesswork, opinion--doxa rather than epistēmē."² This conviction (and Popper is well aware that it too is an opinion) is suggested by three great revolutions of late nineteenth and early twentieth century thought: the reform of Aristotelian logic carried out by George Boole and others, the invention of alternate geometries by Lobachevsky and Riemann, as well as the overthrow of Newton by Einstein. Popper is convinced that had these events occurred before Kant wrote his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant would have formulated his problem and the solution he gave to it quite differently. Popper's own thought on scientific methodology can be seen as such a reformulation.

The crucial point in this reformulation is the fact that we no longer have to assume that we possess any absolutely certain, final, scientific theories. Popper therefore modifies Kant's assertion that "our intellect does not draw its laws from nature...but imposes them upon nature"³ with the more modest "Our intellect does not draw its laws from nature, but tries--with varying degrees of success--to impose upon nature laws which it freely invents."⁴ Popper, with Kant, fully accepts Hume's criticism of induction. He agrees that there is no inductive logic that allows us to derive natural laws from experience. But, unlike Kant, he feels no necessity to show how we are nevertheless in possession of any such certain natural laws. We possess what might be called laws of nature, but it is we who invented them and we can never be sure that they are true, no matter how many experimental tests they may pass.

This state of affairs might be construed as reducing science to a set of myths and placing it on the same level as metaphysics. This is, however, not the case. It is true that scientific theories are myths, and that metaphysical theories are also. But Popper thinks there is a clear distinction between the two types of theories. Scientific theories have testable consequences; metaphysical theories have no such consequences.⁵ If a theory has testable consequences, it runs the risk of being falsified. When a

theory has been falsified, we know we must find a better one to replace it. Thus, with scientific theories, although we have no criterion of truth, we do have a criterion of progress. The currently accepted theories have passed all the tests their discarded predecessors had failed.

This theory of scientific method is called by Popper the method of conjectures and refutations. It solves at least two very important problems. First, it solves the problem of induction by saying it is not important where we get our theories from, only how we test them. And it solves the problem of distinguishing scientific theories from metaphysical theories by allowing any testable theory scientific status and denying such status to any untestable theory.⁶ The first of these points is very important for our purposes. It can be reformulated as saying that there is no scientific method of discovering truth. The scientific method consists of criticizing, testing and attempting to falsify theories which are put forward; the origins of such theories are of no scientific interest.

Popper goes further than this. He asserts that this method of conjectures and refutations, or of trial and error, is the only one for approaching nearer to the truth. There are no fool-proof methods of intuition, no secret formulas for finding truths. This does not mean

that one cannot use meditation or any other subjective method in order to formulate new conjectures. It means that knowledge is never self-validating, never comes with a pedigree. No matter how certain we are that we have "discovered" a truth, criticisms by others may show us that we are mistaken.⁷

This epistemological position has, it seems to me, much to recommend it. It makes no extravagant claims. It says only that men are capable of detecting mistakes and learning from mistakes through mutual discussion and criticism. It "solves" the problem of induction by saying that we cannot ever establish with certainty the truth of a universal statement. This does not involve despair, as we can often discover that a universal is false by detecting a false particular consequence of the universal. This allows for the possibility of progress toward truth without the assurance that we will ever find any "final" truths. In order to accept this position, one must believe that men are able to agree about the truth or falsity of at least some particular statements, and that they can agree on enough logic to accept a modus tollens argument. This epistemology also is less authoritarian than others, as it accords no "special place" to any method of finding truth, but encourages all to search for truth in any manner they choose, provided only that they submit their alleged truths to test and discussion by all

who wish to participate.

Popper's position also replaces the question "what do we know?" with the question "how do we learn?" and he answers that second question in a simple and unified way. Whether we are trying to learn how to play tennis or trying to do mathematical physics, we learn by trial-and-error, by making attempts and then making adjustments when our attempts fail. This unified epistemology gives no preference to science over philosophy, but it does give preference to positions which are open to refutation, over positions which are rigid and dogmatic. Popper's view is to me much more acceptable than epistemologies which claim to have a "pipe-line" to truth, some "infallible" method for "uncovering" reality, like Ortega's "radical method." Popper's epistemological position is, of course, important to everything else he says, including his arguments against historicism.

In developing Popper's arguments against historicism, it is appropriate to begin with his definition of historicism.

I mean by 'historicism' an approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction is their principal aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the 'rhythms' or the 'patterns', the 'laws' or the 'trends' that underlie the evolution of history. ⁸

His criticism of this doctrine takes three distinct forms. First, he feels he has a logical refutation of the possibility of successfully predicting the future. Second,

he argues against historicism as a doctrine whose widespread acceptance has led to enormous human suffering. Third, he argues that historicism constitutes a poor method, one which is based on gross misunderstandings of the methods of physical science and which produces meager results.

The logical argument against historicism proceeds as follows.⁹ The course of human history is strongly influenced by the growth of human knowledge. The future growth of human knowledge cannot possibly be predicted by rational or scientific methods, for "if there is such a thing as growing human knowledge, then we cannot anticipate today what we shall only know tomorrow."¹⁰ Therefore, there can be scientific prediction of the future insofar as that future depends on the growth of knowledge. Popper concludes that "we must reject the possibility of a theoretical history; that is to say, of a historical social science that would correspond to theoretical physics."¹¹ I think that this argument is suggestive, but it is surely not conclusive. Popper recognized that the premise about predicting future knowledge required a separate proof if the argument were to avoid circularity. He promised to give such a proof in a book to be called Postscript: after Twenty Years, which was to be a sequel to his Logic of Scientific Discovery. This sequel, however, has never appeared. This leaves the argument inconclusive. I have included

it for the sake of completeness. Now I will take up Popper's two other lines of attack on historicism, lines which I find much more effective.

The argument that belief in historicism is harmful is presented in Popper's two volume work The Open Society and its Enemies. His view is that if we believe that our future is not in our hands, then we will give up as a useless effort the fight for the kind of society we want. If we become convinced that totalitarianism, for instance, is inevitable, then we will give up the fight against it. Also, belief in historicism tends to divide men into leaders and led, into an elite that knows what is to come and the masses who should be led by the wise. Popper sees this authoritarian element as a dominant theme in the thought of Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle, Hegel and many moderns. He calls this element "oracular philosophy." It is easily used as an excuse for tyranny and has been a major element in Communist and Fascist oppression in our own century.

If, however, the historicists are right, then does not Popper's defense of democracy and his insistence that we are the makers of our fate lose all force? If the historicists really do know "the clue to history," is it not ridiculous for us to oppose them? Popper agrees that it would be absurd; so he attacks historicism on its merits and shows that it is a poor method, a method unable to make good its claims. It is this part of his criticism

which will be developed in order to show the poverty of Ortega's historicism. The particular historicist doctrines which will be treated are methodological essentialism, holism, the alleged inapplicability of mathematical methods to social science, historical prophecy and the alleged existence of laws of historical development and cycles.

The doctrine of methodological essentialism holds that the goal of science is to lay bare the essences behind the appearances with which it deals. Thus a methodological essentialist in physics would hold that physics should give us the essential meanings of gravity, electricity, etc. Methodological nominalists insist that the scientist should describe behavior, not reveal essences. In the physical sciences, it is rather clear that the nominalists have won the day. "Physics does not inquire, for instance, into the essence of atoms or of light, but it uses these terms with great freedom to explain and describe certain physical observations...So it is with biology."¹² In the social sciences and in history, essentialism still seems to hold sway. Popper thinks it is no accident that the sciences which are nominalistic are the advanced sciences and that the most backward sciences are still using essentialist methods.

[T]he degree to which the various sciences have been able to make any progress depended on the degree to which they have been able to get rid of this essentialist method. (This is why so much of our 'social science' still belongs to the middle ages.)¹³

Those who favor the use of methodological essentialism in the social sciences can be divided into two camps. Some believe that essentialism should be the method of all the sciences, often mistakenly thinking that it is used in the physical sciences. Others acknowledge that nominalism is appropriate in physical sciences but insist that essentialism is appropriate for the "human" sciences. We have pointed out that the method of essentialism has been abandoned in physical science, and so a demand to return to it (where it proved fruitless) has little force. The doctrine that the subject matter of social science, namely human life, dictates different methods from those which work in physics is a far more serious matter.

Those who argue for essentialist methods in social science, but not in physical science, often base their claim on the primacy of change in all things human. The basic terms in physics, for example, are not intrinsically historical. But entities such as class, state and society are in their very natures historical, changing entities, and we can only understand them if we study their history. "History, i. e., the description of change, and essence, i. e., that which remains unchanged during change, appear ...as correlative concepts."¹⁴ Thus it is the historical character of the objects which we study in social science that allegedly dictates a historical method of study aimed at revealing the essences of these objects.

Popper argues that the belief in these essences involves a version of Whitehead's fallacy of misplaced concreteness. "The state," for instance, is an abstract created model which men use in the analysis of certain social phenomena. Similarly abstract concepts are social classes, armies, political parties, intelligentsias, and many others. These are concepts which we invent, not concrete objects that we find in the world. In thinking about any one of these abstract models, it is a common mistake "to feel that we see it, either within or behind the changing observable events, as a kind of permanent ghost or essence."¹⁵ Since such essences simply do not exist, it can hardly be the task of social sciences to discover them. The social scientist's models may be different from those of the physical scientist, but each works with freely created models and tests consequences of his creations against experience. Thus there is, or at least there can be, a basic unity of method among all the sciences.

I do not wish to be misunderstood here. There surely are important differences between the respective subject matters of, say, physics and sociology, and these do suggest certain differences in the respective methods of study. For instance, one would probably not conduct a poll among a group of atoms. What I am saying is that nothing about the subject matter of history or social science dictates or even recommends the employment of the method of

essentialism.

Another doctrine of historicism which Popper attacks is the idea that history and social science must deal with things as organic wholes, a doctrine Popper calls "holism." According to this view, social wholes are like biological organisms. A social whole cannot be properly understood if one considers only its constituent parts, or the individuals who make it up, in the case of a collective. Social wholes are more than the sum of their parts, just as a melody is more than a group of isolated notes. There is, however, an important ambiguity in the way in which many historicists use the word "whole." Popper distinguishes between the two following uses of the term.

(a) the totality of all the properties or aspects of a thing, and especially of all the relations holding between its constituent parts, and (b) certain special properties or aspects of the thing in question, namely those which make it appear an organized structure rather than a mere heap.¹⁶

Wholes in sense (b) can be described and studied systematically. We all acknowledge the clear difference between the unassembled parts in an amplifier kit and the assembled amplifier. Similarly, we see the differences between eight men and women and the same eight men and women forming a committee designed to perform a set of tasks. But wholes in sense (a) can neither be described nor discussed. For all description, all discussion is necessarily selective. The total description of any ob-

ject, situation, phenomenon, etc., is necessarily infinite (and therefore nonexistent). "It may even be said that wholes in sense (a) can never be the object of any activity, scientific or otherwise."¹⁷ So while wholes in sense (a) cannot be discussed by any methods whatsoever, wholes in sense (b) are studied routinely in all the sciences and so provide no basis for the claim that the study of social wholes requires historicist methods.

Closely related to the idea of holism (but independent of any confusion between wholes in senses (a) and (b)) is the notion that history and social science must use a method of intuitive understanding rather than any exact mathematical methods. The claim is that social wholes are qualitative in nature and resist treatment by rigid exact methods. Popper counters this with the evidence that just such mathematical methods have been and are being successfully applied to large-scale social phenomena. Consider, for instance, mathematical economics, and the remarkable success of polling in sociology, especially in predicting political elections. While these successes are not as astonishing as those of mathematical physics, where is any corresponding or competing achievement involving the method of intuitive understanding?

So far, we have examined some methodological differences between historicism and science. What of historicism's main claim that it is both possible and desirable

to have a theoretical social science which predicts the future? Two claims often put forward by historicists will be considered. The first asserts that the ability to predict the future is based on the discernment of some inexorable law of historical development, such as Hegel's "progression in the consciousness of freedom" or Marx's law of the progression of the class struggle. A variation of this, also quite common, is the belief in historical cycles, whose stages every society must pass through.

Nearly all historicists have held that it is "the task of the social sciences to lay bare the law of evolution of society in order to foretell its future."¹⁸ Popper characterizes this as the central doctrine of historicism, and he thinks that Darwin's theory of evolution and the successful long-term predictions of astronomy have spurred contemporary interest in finding such a law of development.¹⁹ Popper asserts that no such law can exist.

[T]he search for the law of the 'invariant order' in evolution cannot possibly fall within the scope of scientific method, whether in biology or in sociology. My reasons are very simple. The evolution on earth, or of human society, is a unique historical process.²⁰

There is thus no other process available to us against which we can test any such law of evolution. Historicists may object that it is then irrational to believe in Darwin's law of evolution. And, indeed, they would be right, for his hypothesis

is not a universal law...It has, rather, the character of a particular...historical statement. It is of the same status as the historical statement: 'Charles Darwin and Frances Galton had a common grandfather.'²¹

Even if historicists could find as good a hypothesis about social evolution as Darwin found for biological evolution, they should be discouraged from prophecy based on it, for biology claims no ability to predict future developments in the evolution of species. The more important point, however, is that any such alleged law of social evolution is incapable of being tested, at least in the present. Thus in Popper's sense it would be a metaphysical statement and should not be part of any social science.

Given a passage of time, historical prophecies are refutable. For instance, sufficient time has gone by for us to see that most of Marx's prophecies have turned out to be false. In addition, there is another problem with prophecies which involves the effect on the future which the very existence of the prophecy may have.

Popper calls this the "Oedipus effect" and thinks some of Marx's prophecies were instrumental in changing the very social conditions which might have made them come true.²² In any case, the assertion that one has discovered a law which reveals the future cannot be a scientific statement in Popper's sense, for it cannot be tested in the present. It may be an interesting asser-

tion, people may choose to believe it, or it may even be true, but it is not scientific.

Nevertheless, are we not justified in hoping that we can find such laws of succession? Should we not eventually be able to predict revolutions the way we can predict eclipses? The analogy between prophecy and astronomy is an old and beguiling one, but Popper points out that the kind of prediction we make in astronomy is scientifically very rare.

In general it is only by the use of artificial experimental isolation that we can predict physical events. (The solar system is an exceptional case--one of natural, not of artificial isolation; once its isolation is destroyed by the intrusion of a foreign body of sufficient size, all our forecasts are liable to break down.) We are very far from being able to predict, even in physics, the precise result of a concrete situation, such as a thunderstorm, or a fire.²³

One may, of course, spot a trend in a historical situation, like the growth of population, but trends are not laws, and those which have held for hundreds of years may disappear overnight. When a thinker insists that we all anticipate the future whenever we make a decision, he is right. We do make predictions based on assumptions, usually having to do with the continuing of certain trends. Such examples of planning ahead in no way show that we believe that the future is unfolding according to some inexorable law. Indeed, we often plan ahead precisely because we do not believe in inexorable laws about our fu-

ture.

An important argument against the uniqueness of the historical process is the argument that history is repetitive, and that each society goes through a certain life cycle as does each human being. If this position is valid, then we need only study the life cycles of past societies in order to be able to predict our own future course. Many thinkers, including Plato, Machiavelli, Vico, Hegel, Spengler and Toynbee (and of course Ortega) have held such a view. Even Popper has some sympathy with it. "I do not intend to deny...that history may sometimes repeat itself in certain respects."²⁴

Popper picks Toynbee's theory of historical cycles as his example for criticism. He does so because of his belief that Toynbee has developed the most detailed and sophisticated (and therefore the most dangerous) version of the theory. Toynbee claims he developed his theory of cycles by examining twenty-one different civilizations. From what has been said above, this appeal to inductive methods carries little force. In addition, Popper feels that Toynbee "seems to overlook the fact that he classifies as civilizations only such entities as conform to his a priori belief in life cycles."²⁵ The twenty-one "verifications" of his theory mean little if he has failed to look for social structures which refute it. There are literally thousands of social structures among which he

might have found refutations of his view, for example, those of any of a number of Pueblo Indians of the American Southwest.

The main point about all such prophecies is their irrefutability. In the case of the "cycles" type of prophecy, we do not know when the next stage in the trend is to happen and even exactly what it is to be. So the believer can always argue in the face of seeming refutations that not enough time has passed, or that the present situation is simply a small retrograde motion away from the inevitable result which will sooner or later happen. Prophecy may indeed be possible, but scientific prophecy is not.

This concludes our brief look at Karl Popper's critique of historicism. The treatment has been by no means exhaustive. I have tried to select those aspects of his criticism that apply to Ortega's version of historicism. In the next chapter, such an application will be attempted.

CHAPTER V, FOOTNOTES

¹CAR, p. 27.

²CAR, p. 26.

³CAR, p. 191.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Popper makes no attempt to show that metaphysical statements are meaningless, as Carnap and Wittgenstein and so many others have tried to do.

⁶It may not in practice be so easy to tell whether or not a given theory has testable consequences. Paradoxically, after a theory has been refuted, its status as scientific is secure.

⁷Popper is fond of the example that some children cannot imagine anyone not liking chocolate.

⁸TPOH, p. 3.

⁹See TPOH, pp. vi-vii.

¹⁰TPOH, p. vii.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²TPOH, p. 29.

¹³TOSAIE, II, p. 9.

¹⁴TPOH, p. 33.

¹⁵TPOH, p. 136.

¹⁶TPOH, p. 76.

¹⁷TPOH, p. 77.

¹⁸TPOH, pp. 105-6.

¹⁹This is not to say that the belief that the future can be predicted systematically is some kind of avant-garde view. It is very old, going back at least to Heraclitus. It is often presented, however, as being very revolutionary and completely novel.

²⁰TPOH, p. 108.

²¹TPOH, p. 107.

²²This illustrates at least one difference between social science and physical science caused by their different subject matters.

²³TPOH, p. 139.

²⁴TPOH, p. 110.

²⁵TPOH, p. 111.

CHAPTER VI

POPPER'S CRITIQUE APPLIED TO ORTEGA

It should be abundantly clear from what has been said of Ortega's philosophy of history and of Popper's characterization of historicism that Ortega is a historicist. He has stated categorically that "the labour of history is only scientific in proportion to the place that prophecy can occupy in it;"¹ and this emphasis, we have said, is for Popper the hallmark of historicism. In addition, Ortega over and over insists that a "special" type of thinking is required for the understanding of history and for prophesying the future.

Popper has tried to show that the scientific method, no matter what science is referred to, consists of trial and error, conjecture and refutation. Ortega, on the other hand, sees a host of different scientific methods. For him, the subject matter, the kind of being which is investigated, dictates the method of study. The contrast between a supposed "physical reason," applicable only to physics and an equally supposed "historical reason" applicable to the study of human life, is perhaps the strongest example of his belief in the disunity of science.

Ortega insists that physics is based on a special

type of imagination which he calls physical reason, which is abstract, precise, and mathematical. What is stressed is an alleged method by which physicists find truth, not how they test it.² In addition, Ortega's perspectivism confines scientific truth to the truths appropriate to each historical period. And this assertion allegedly applies to physics as well as to all other fields.

Of what use would Einstein's truth have been to Galileo? Truth descends only on him who tries for it, who carries within himself, preformed, a mental space where the truth may eventually lodge.³

And if such truth does descend on a thinker, it must also lodge preformed in the society in which he lives. For if it does not, he will "find himself preaching in the desert."⁴

I submit that, at least in physics, this idea is patently false. There is some basis for it in cosmology, but not in physics, and the two are often confused. For instance, Aristarchus put forward the theory that the planets revolved around the sun rather than around the earth. He was right but he was rejected, not because the world was not ready for his idea, but because he was unable to show that his theory was better than the stationary earth theory. Had he found rotation phenomena, for instance, he might have had his theory taken more seriously. Since he was unable to refute the accepted theory, which quite satisfactorily explained the then-known phenomena, it remained the accepted theory. It is perhaps true that non-sci-

entists "were not ready" to give up the earth-centered theory.

Another example is that of Archimedes. He got very close to inventing calculus. That he did not quite make it (although he may have and we simply do not know about it) does not show that the world was not ready for calculus and would not be ready until Newton. Mathematics advances on the basis of arguments it offers, and had Archimedes developed the arguments of calculus, the Greeks would have understood them and accepted them.

This notion of truth having its time involves those who accept it in the common historicist vice of not discussing arguments on their merits. If we claim we are explaining a theory by showing its origin, by fitting it into the spirit of the age, or by relating it to the economic structure of the times, we can then ignore the question of whether the theory is true or not. Popper illustrates this vice with Toynbee's treatment of Marx.⁵ Toynbee shows the origin of Marx's ideas in his Jewish background, making analogies by which the workers are the chosen people and historical necessity plays the role of God. Popper happens to find this analogy rather apt, if it is only an analogy.

But if it is intended as a serious analysis... of Marxism, then I must protest: Marx...wrote Capital, studied laissez-faire capitalism, and made serious and most important contributions to social science...Of Marx's theories and of

the question whether they are true or false we do not hear a word.⁶

Perhaps Ortega would not "explain away" a theory as utterly as Toynbee. But we know he confines truth to periods and that he sees that

The fundamental task of history, if it wishes to be in all seriousness a science, must be to show how this philosophy, or that political system, could only have been discovered, developed, and, in short, lived by a particular type of man who lived at a particular date.⁷

In any case, explaining theories instead of taking them on their merits removes the possibility of reconciling conflicting theories, and if the conflict is over an important enough issue, leaves only force to settle matters.

The "period" concept of truth can have very bad social consequences. But, more important from my point of view, it is contradicted by the vastly different rates of growth of knowledge which prevail in the different sciences. The sciences which use the critical method, the method of refutations, advance rapidly. Sciences like economics and sociology begin to grow rapidly as they put forward testable (often, though not always, mathematical) theories. These rates do not depend on any "spirits of the time"; they depend on whether the individual sciences cling to essentialist methods, or adopt the simple trial-and-error method that has worked so well in physics.

Turning to some of the particular historicist doctrines which Ortega holds, we will begin with his belief

that mathematics is completely inappropriate to the study of man's being, his life. We have pointed out in Chapter Three how utterly opposed to the spirit of life mathematics is in Ortega's view. Mathematical methods, however, are being successfully applied in social science despite their alleged inappropriateness. And Ortega himself has used a highly artificial mathematical construction in his treatment of generations. The use of mathematics in the study of human life is no more illicit than is its use in physics. Methods of explanation are freely invented--if they happen to use formulas, fine; if not, also fine. The question of whether or not a theory is mathematical has nothing to do with its scientific status.

Ortega's view that the type of being under study dictates the methods appropriate to reveal that being is closely tied in with the fact that he is a methodological essentialist. Sometimes he espouses essentialism in physics (a view that surely does not describe the methods used in physics), but at all times he favors essentialism in history and social science. The purpose of his main work on the social sciences, Man and People, is precisely to exhibit the essential natures of the social, of society, of the state, etc. He severely criticizes sociologists for not being essentialist, asserting that our task should be to "hold ourselves resolutely to defining what the social is, what society is."⁸ The book is filled with at-

tempts to discover what the state is, or what society is. The example of the salutation has as its purpose revealing what a usage is. And, Ortega is convinced that he has a method for revealing essences which is error-free.

The thing is to avoid making hypotheses, suppositions, plausible as they may seem, and to devote ourselves to contemplating just what happens to us is so far as it happens to us when we execute a salutation. Only this radical method can save us from error.⁹

Unfortunately, nothing can save us from error, including the so-called radical method. We have to expect that, despite whatever precautions we take, we will make mistakes. The thing is not to avoid making mistakes but to learn from the mistakes we make. Not only is the "radical method" for revealing the essence of, say, society, fallible, but also the whole essentialist goal is one which leads nowhere in science. The reason Ortega did not find much essence-revealing in the sociology he read is that such an approach has already been tried (as far back as the Greeks) and found wanting.

Ortega believes in "holism," as well as essentialism, in social science and history. He attempts to discuss wholes in the sense of concrete totalities, the type Popper has classed as type (a), and which he has shown to be undiscussible. A generation is such a whole. The entirety of a man's life is also. The most grandiose such whole which Ortega wants to consider is history in its

entirety. If we discuss a generation, or a man's life, or some aspect of history, our discussion is always selective and therefore any reasoning we do is abstract. When we try to find the "meaning" of a man's life, we must always face the possibility that we are leaving out things which appear to us as irrelevant but which in fact are very important. Before Freud, it is unlikely that anyone discussing a man's political opinions would have considered his toilet training as relevant. There simply cannot be a "higher" type of concrete reasoning about totalities. All reasoning is of necessity abstract.

Arising out of this confusion between concrete and abstract reason is Ortega's view that history has "its own autochthonous reason." History cannot have any kind of reason because history in its entirety simply does not exist. Ortega wants to assert that we can find the "meaning" of history by seeing all its facts as unified in human life.

[A] human fact is never a pure matter of happening and befalling--it is a function of an entire human life, individual or collective; it belongs to what one might call an organism of facts in which each one plays its own active and dynamic role.¹⁰

Now this sounds very good. We do not want to look at facts in isolation; we want to find a structure within which they take on meaning. This is what we do in any scientific endeavor. There is a crucial difference, how-

ever, between such unifying theories in physics and in history. For such "general" theories in history are subject to the following severe limitation.

[I]n history...the facts at our disposal are often severely limited and cannot be repeated or implemented at our will. And they have been collected in accordance with a preconceived point of view: the so-called 'sources' of history only record such facts as appeared sufficiently interesting to record, so that the sources will, as a rule, contain only facts that fit in with a preconceived theory. And since no further facts are available, it will not, as a rule, be possible to test that or any subsequent theory...we can rarely obtain new data able to serve as do crucial experiments in physics.¹¹

In physics, we can usually invent some crucial experiments which can tell us which of two competing theories is superior,¹² and these are needed quite often.

"Even in the field of physics...new crucial experiments are needed again and again because the old ones are all in keeping with two competing and incompatible theories."¹³ This situation makes it highly implausible that in history, with its much more meager set of facts, "any definite set of historical records can ever interpreted in one way only."¹⁴

It is extremely improbable, then, that Ortega can discover history's "own autochthonous reason" or, if he happened to, that he could ever show that his interpretation of history's meaning was any better than a dozen other competing interpretations. Once a point of view is

taken up, one can, of course, write an interesting and informative history. One can find trends and developments that others, using different points of view, have missed. But trends are not laws, and it is nothing but a misleading exaggeration to call one or another trend history's "own autochthonous reason."¹⁵

Nevertheless, it is clear that Ortega, like most historicists, believes in a historical law of development by which we can understand the past and predict the future. When we examine particular histories, like, say, the history of painting, we usually can order things in a coherent way. Ortega often says that historical developments unfold with a kind of psychological necessity; they make sense as a whole, like the events in an individual's life which can be seen to flow out of his character. Although this is quite reasonable, it has nothing to do with predicting the future. Consider the type of internal coherence that a symphony has, for instance. Notes seem to flow out of each other with a kind of necessity. But that is only after we have heard it. If such coherence implied some kind of inevitable progression, then we would only need to hear, say the first ten notes (or five? or fifteen?) of a new symphony and then we could derive the rest. Composers could simply begin great musical works, write "etc." on the page, and have them completed by assistants. History, like music, may make sense after it happens.

This does not at all imply that either is predictable.

In addition to believing that history contains an internal law of development, it is clear that Ortega believes in historical cycles. In particular, he holds the view that history repeats itself in analogy with the childhood, maturity, and old age cycle of individual human life. In discussing such cycles, Ortega usually limits himself to the examples of Greece, Rome and Europe. As an example of an invariable cyclic phenomenon, he attempts to show that a period of rationalism always precedes a revolutionary period. He may have found three confirmations for this alleged "cyclic law" in Greece, Rome and Europe (really, France); but for this sequence of rationalism-revolution to constitute some kind of law, it ought to always hold. Therefore, a few confirmations mean nothing if there exist obvious refutations of the "law." And there was such an obvious refutation before Ortega's very eyes: the Russian Revolution. It was preceded by no period of rationalism at all, let alone a period of excessive rationalism. Yet surely it is one of the most profound revolutionary upheavals in all of human history.

It may be appropriate to point out here that Ortega seldom looks for refutations of theories and is very impressed with even one confirmation of a theory. On the rare occasions when he considers views competing with his

own, he does not refute them but, rather, makes light of his opponent. In considering a rival historical theory of Herbert Spencer's, he tells us Spencer "was a good engineer but no historian,"¹⁶ but fails to refute his theory. And when he takes up Ranke's famous "History proposes to find out how things actually happened," Ortega lets us know that "his phrase seems to me a bit stupid."¹⁷

In addition to his failure to refute competing theories, he seems to believe that one or a few confirmations of his own theories make them highly probable. For instance, Einstein's theory of relativity could be said to "fit in" with Ortega's perspectivism. However, Ortega sees "impressive confirmation of this theory in the work of Einstein."¹⁸ It would seem that something impressively confirmed a theory only if it refuted all competing ones. In this case, what epistemologies were refuted by Einstein's theory?

When Ortega is arguing for his chronology of the generations and he considers Hobbes, who he finds fits the theory, he says "the case of Hobbes confirms the proposed seriation in the most rigorous manner."¹⁹ Can this be anything other than a gross exaggeration? To give one final example, he uses the African Tuareg, the Masai tribe, and the Tibetans as three confirmations of various aspects of his theory of the salutation. What about the thousands of other social structures in the world? Did he look among

them for refutation? Any theory will agree with many facts. Unless one has tried to refute the theory, these "confirmations" mean nothing.

It has now been shown that Ortega is a historicist and that he clearly holds the specific historicist beliefs in non-mathematical methods in social science, methodological essentialism, holism, a historical law of development, and historical cycles. I now want to examine again two particular examples of how Ortega does historical analysis. They are his theory of generations and his etymology of the handshake. These have been discussed before, but now I want to look at them as conjectures in Popper's sense.

Ortega's theory of generation really is two theories. One is that in times of crisis, a great generation comes upon the scene destined to set a new course and invent a new set of beliefs in which men can dwell. His classic example is the generation of Descartes and the invention of modern rationalism. That generations of this type exist is indisputable. Even Popper sees the generation of Pericles, which he calls "the great generation," as responsible for the birth of the great spirit of Greek science.²⁰

Ortega was impressed by the famous generation of ninety-eight, a group of outstanding Spanish thinkers and writers, who, shocked by Spain's crushing defeat in the Spanish-American War, took it upon themselves to drag

Spain out of the Middle Ages and into the twentieth century. But these "great generations," though they surely exist, are rare occurrences. Ortega has generalized, conjectured, that all history is divided into fifteen-year segments, each of which is ruled by the intellects of the time who are between forty-five and sixty years of age. This thesis is certainly a conjecture in Popper's sense of the term. The possibility that it may be a wild generalization of the notion of isolated "great" generations is irrelevant to its scientific status. The question is, is it a refutable conjecture?

In order at least to attempt a refutation, suppose we consider whether or not such a sequence of generations can be detected in a single nation with a common language. We might consider the United States from 1865, the date usually taken as the beginning of this country as an industrial, modern state, to 1965. Can this period be neatly divided into fifteen-year periods characterized by very different modes of thought? What comes to mind if we say the generation of X? To me, at least, nothing. Where are these alleged clearly separated generations? The theory of generations is untestable (and therefore metaphysical in Popper's sense), for we cannot even isolate a sequence of generations on which to test it.

The case of the etymology of the handshake is perhaps more interesting. The idea of trying to guess the

origins of traditional behaviors which we perform, but do not understand, is a fertile and interesting one. Ortega's particular etymology of the handshake seems very plausible and it suggests possible avenues of refutation. There are many peoples who are at a primitive stage of life. Their salutations could be investigated in order to attempt to refute Ortega's theory. But the evidence is limited, and we cannot perform experiments in this field, only examine what primitive social groups exist and also look at the meager records we have on past forms of the salutation. The whole idea of examining usages as to their origins is, I feel, one of Ortega's real contributions to social science. His work in etymologies constitutes the solid and significant part of "historical reason."²¹

Of the rest of Ortega's alleged historical reason, one cannot be so complimentary. His claim to have discovered a revolutionary tool for the understanding of human life is not justified. He has just re-discovered historicism. What he did discover in his historical research, and this was of real significance, was the loss of faith in science, at least as a religion, as a belief. I think he isolated very acutely the crises in physics and mathematics, caused mainly by the work of Einstein and secondarily, by the emergence of non-Euclidean geometry, non-Aristotelian logic and finitism in mathematics,

as the causes of this loss of faith.²² Scientists themselves helped in fostering this disillusionment with science by promising too much, by putting us off to the Greek kalends, as Ortega was quick to notice. He is completely correct in pointing out that science cannot reveal the absolute truth to us. If, in addition, he is right in thinking that men must have unquestioned beliefs to live by, then the world is indeed in trouble. For science cannot provide such truths, and neither can anything else.

Ortega mistakenly believes his "historical reason" can fill the need for "a new revelation." Popper urges us to avoid looking for revelations and to recognize that there are no certain truths to live by. But he also urges us not to let the knowledge of the tentative and uncertain character of scientific truth disillusion us. If we become both disillusioned with science and hungry for truth, we become the prey of the charlatan and the quack who promise us instant enlightenment. It is sad that in the face of his own disillusionment with science Ortega grabbed hold of an old and intellectually feeble tool like historicism.

Popper calls this current crisis, so perceptively discerned by Ortega by 1920, the revolt against reason. He feels that if we give in to it, give up on science, we will go back to barbarism. The only cycle Popper sees in history is the ever-present danger of lapsing from civi-

lization to barbarism.²³ We must, he feels, apply our science (that is, the method of trial and error) to the problems of society. The crisis in science forces us to go ahead, with the sad knowledge that we have no direct pipe-line to the truth, but heartened by the knowledge that we do have a way to get closer to it. If we give that up for any false doctrine, whether it be historicism, astrology, or LSD, rebarbarization is all we have to look forward to.

FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER VI

¹TMT, p. 22.

²I do not wish to assert that Ortega does not believe in experimental testing. He surely does, but nowhere does he put any emphasis on the refuting character of experiments.

³WIP, p. 183.

⁴WIP, p. 32.

⁵See TOSAIE II, pp. 251-258.

⁶TOSAIE II, p. 253.

⁷WIP, p. 25.

⁸MAP, p. 14.

⁹MAP, p. 186.

¹⁰MAC, p. 17.

¹¹TOSAIE II, pp. 265-6.

¹²Not always, of course. There are competing theories which seem to give identical sets of testable consequences, and then science must make some other (perhaps less satisfactory) basis, like simplicity, or ease of use, for choosing which theory is to count as the accepted one.

¹³TOSAIE II, p. 266.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵In addition, this modest position of taking up a point of view and writing the history that interests the writer is much more in line with Ortega's own view of perspectivism. It is my view that he constantly vacillates between a modest and rational position of understanding in a very limited way, and grandiose claims of finding large-scale absolute truth.

¹⁶HAAS, p. 73.

¹⁷MAC, p. 17.

¹⁸TMT, p. 92.

¹⁹MAC, p. 64.

²⁰See TOSAIE I, pp. 185-9.

²¹Popper would surely agree. See his essay "Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition," CAR, pp. 120-135.

²²It is striking that the first three of these events are precisely the ones that led Popper to his views on scientific methodology. Both Ortega and Popper realized that these events meant science was not a revealer of truth. Popper concluded that there was no revealed truth, i. e., truth of which we can be absolutely certain, while Ortega decided to look elsewhere for it.

²³Ortega shares this fear that we may be lapsing

into barbarism. He wrote The Revolt of the Masses to give a warning about this real and frightening possibility.

CHAPTER VII

ORTEGA'S THOUGHT AS AN INSUFFICIENT BASIS FOR ETHICS

In 1943, the Mexican Jesuit J. S. Villaseñor published a vitriolic attack on Ortega called Ortega y Gasset, Existentialist.¹ In this book Ortega's thought is condemned as totally relativistic, skeptical, and nihilistic. Villaseñor singles out Ortega as one of the thinkers whose wrong and dangerous ideas led to the Nazi phenomenon. Speaking of the Second World War and its relation to nihilistic thought, he says, "In an inferno of horrors Europe has atoned for the poisonous fruits of those disintegrating ideas."² Villaseñor wrote during the holocaust, and this partly explains the harshness of his attack. The same is true of Popper's attack on Hegel in his The Open Society and its Enemies, of which he says, "I looked upon my book as my war effort."³ Popper also isolates nihilist thought as being a major contributor to the war. A third work which sees nihilist movements in thought as responsible for the war is Albert Camus' The Rebel.⁴

All three of these books are, in varying degrees, applicable to Ortega's thought. Villaseñor attacks him directly. Popper never mentions his name. Camus does

not mention him by name in The Rebel. In at least one other⁵ context he praises Ortega but links him with the thinker whom he isolates as one of the main contributors to modern nihilism, Nietzsche.

Ortega, like each of these other three thinkers, believes that ideas are significant forces in history. It is precisely the new ideas of each generation which he believes make for historical change. Also, it is well known that Ortega opposed nihilism strongly, and that in The Revolt of the Masses he foresaw with horror the dangers of fascism as a manifestation of nihilism. What I want to investigate here is the possibility that, although Ortega personally and in print opposed the Nazis, parts of his thought can be used on their behalf. I will attempt to show these things: (1) Villaseñor's charges against Ortega are justified; Ortega's vitalism and elitism can be used to support fascism and mass murder. (2) Villaseñor's "solution" to the problem of nihilism is not helpful and does not speak to the needs of twentieth-century man. (3) Beginning where Ortega begins, with man's disillusioned living, it is possible to construct a modest ethic, one at least sufficient to condemn murder.

First, let us examine Villaseñor's charges against Ortega. He sees Ortega's thought as an attack on religion. "Disdainfully and in the name of intellectual clarity he rejected all religion."⁶ For Villaseñor, this con-

stitutes an extremely serious charge, for he thinks that ethics is impossible without religion.

From the absence of God all of Ortega's errors spring as from a fountain...Morality, once split from religion, loses its force and degenerates into elegant conventionalism, behind which immorality is concealed.⁷

This charge, that Ortega's thought is cut off from God, is true, but unimportant. Ortega simply recognized that European man does not abide in belief in God and has not for hundreds of years. If Ortega is guilty of anything here, it is simply of not being scholastic. If Villaseñor did no more than charge Ortega with atheism, we would not even mention his name. Our question is whether or not there is at least a part of Ortega's thought which leads to nihilism and the justification of mass murder.

The next charge Villaseñor brings against Ortega is that of irrationalism. We know that Ortega saw rationalism as an inadequate belief, one that, like religion, men could no longer abide in. He claimed not to be an irrationalist, but rather, a believer in a "vital reason." Villaseñor is convinced, and I think he is correct, that Ortega's insistence on the primacy of life over reason and on the perspectivist theory of truth leads to both irrationalism and relativism, for all truth is individual; there is no supra-individual check to detect error. However, the world appears from my perspective is a truth.

Villaseñor states that Ortega's rejection of rationalism "dragged [him] further than he wished, into complete irrationalism."⁸ Thus he finds that Ortega's thought is relativistic, irrational, and ultimately skeptical. Ortega is left only with disillusioned life on which to build. On this basis, is it possible to construct an ethic by which to live, or is one condemned to nihilism, to a position which says that everything is permitted? Villaseñor thinks the latter is the case, asserting that Ortega espouses an ethical vitalism, by which one exuberantly unfolds one's potentialities, no matter what they may be. On this interpretation, the only ethic one can find on Ortega's thought is an ethic of pure action, an ethic which says everything is permitted. The great man is he who fulfills his destiny. A hint that this is indeed Ortega's position is given by his extravagant praise of Napoleon.⁹

I think Villaseñor's charges are justified. Consider first Ortega's admitted vitalism, especially as it appears in The Modern Theme. There he says that life itself constitutes a quantitative hierarchy of increasing vitality. "There is no necessity to have recourse to extra-vital considerations, theological, cultural, etc. Life itself selects and constructs its hierarchy of values."¹⁰ He applies this to horses as an example, saying that any group of horses naturally arranges itself in a

vital hierarchy. For his example of the super-vital man, as we have said, he picks Napoleon. "[I]t is indisputable that in him the whole structure of man vibrated to the depths, for he was, as Nietzsche said, "The bow strung to the highest possible tension."¹¹ And in even more extravagant praise of Napoleon: "Napoleon, rather than a man, was a superman or demigod."¹²

This kind of "vital superiority" does give a kind of basis for ethics, but it is not a basis which leads to the condemnation of mass-murder; in fact, it provides a basis for lauding the actions of people like Hitler. Ortega's idea of vital superiority does not imply that all actions are equal, for we know that he believed that each man and each generation have their mission, their one best course of action given to them by their historic destiny. A man finds his mission, his vocation, through ensimismamiento, and a generation finds its vocation through the ensimismamiento of its leaders. Each man is free to write the novel of himself, but for each man there is his one best novel, his one best life. How does a man know that he is living his destiny? It is very simple: "each one's destiny is in turn his greatest delight."¹³ This notion of "true vocation" serves for Ortega as a guide for what we should do, as our ethic. It gives no permanent set of rules, but it need not. If we know what to do, why try to solve the problem of how our great-grandchildren should

act? However, his position does make a claim, the claim that we can know what we should do, and more important, that this knowing is a private affair. Thus in ethics, as in science, Ortega places his emphasis on the individual discovering truth in a private manner, rather than on the detection of errors and attempts to overcome these errors.

This is not to say that Ortega never admitted errors or ever changed his views. Indeed, Villaseñor claims that the coming of European fascism did cause Ortega to modify his ethical position, but only temporarily.¹⁴ Villaseñor sees the European crisis as the reason Ortega wrote The Revolt of the Masses. However, Ortega only describes the malady; he gives no cure.

He has pointed out the true evil, but he refuses to explore its ultimate causes...to respect loyally the marvelous lesson taught by the facts...We suspect a secret fear of exposing himself, of correcting the vitalistic immorality evident in his previous writings.¹⁵

Moreover, Villaseñor asserts that Ortega returned to the vitalistic position in his later work.

Ortega quickly forgot the sobering lesson of the masses in revolt. Two years had scarcely passed before he was again proposing his self-determining and vitalistic ethics... Life is ethical in itself. The moral imperative is immanent in man. Duty consists in giving close attention to the interior voice of one's own destiny.¹⁶

I think Villaseñor is correct in seeing The Revolt of the Masses as being quite unlike the rest of Ortega's

work. I will try to show how there is a plausible way to find in the rest of his work a justification for the Nazi movement, or rather two possible ways. First, I want to compare Ortega's treatment of Napoleon to a treatment of Hitler which his thought does not preclude. Then, his notion of the true inner voice will be applied to the Nazi leaders.

We have seen the extravagant praise Ortega heaps upon Napoleon. We also know that one of Napoleon's achievements was the spread of the rationalism of the French Revolution, carrying all over Europe the spirit of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Why not look at Hitler as the spreader of the new great idea, the idea of life?¹⁷--for surely the Nazis were out to replace reason with the vitalist notions of blood and race. They were out to replace the rationalist idea of human equality with an elitism based on racial superiority. I do not wish to accuse Ortega of being a racist, but he is no doubt an elitist. His elitism is vitalist, not intellectual or cultural. He says in 1921, "It is high time to make an end of the traditional hypocrisy which pretends it cannot see in certain human individuals, culturally of little or no interest, a splendour and grace of an animal type."¹⁸ And if it is Hitler, Geobbels, and Goering who so see themselves, what are we to say?

Is it not possible for them to say that they are the

great generation which solves the crisis created by the demise of rationalism and inaugurates the new era to be ruled by vitalistic principles? Given Ortega's generational theory, the emerging "new man" may be anything from saint to beast. Without some extra-individual standard like a judging God or a human nature, whatever emerges as the new form of man is admissible and even right. This leads to a kind of social Darwinism by which groups fight for dominance and we end with an ethic of might is right, precisely the ethic of the Nazis.

Of course, Ortega might argue that it is not a question of might makes right but of might plus right. For the emerging generation is supposed to discover that it is right through listening to the inner voices of its leaders. Each individual listens to his own inner voice and discovers his true destiny. Now it may be that such an inner voice exists. Giving heed only to it is a very dangerous practice, and a completely insufficient basis for ethics. Cannot any criminal argue that he is only pursuing his own true destiny?¹⁹ In fact, criminals nearly always do consider their actions justifiable. How can one ever refute the claim that, no matter how heinous an action may be, it was done as part of "a true destiny?" There is no way of knowing whether or not the "call" is true except by appeal to Ortega's claim that each man's destiny will be his greatest delight, and then pleasure

becomes the criterion for virtue. But the unfortunate fact is, the Nazis, for instance, seemed to enjoy themselves quite fully. Without some extra-individual criterion, there is no way of judging whether what is thought by the individual to be a moral act is in fact one.

Ortega's work can be used to support fascist ideas but we know that Ortega was personally opposed to fascism. What we have found is that Ortega failed to realize, or perhaps ignored, these important consequences of his writings. Men often fail to see all the consequences which flow out of their thought, and men are also often much better than their thought, as Camus' character Father Paneloux shows so well. Or, perhaps, Ortega silently realized that his vitalism fitted in with Nazi ideology but could find no better philosophy which would refute Nazism. For even if Ortega were to accept the negative part of Villaseñor's analysis, he would not accept (and neither would I) Villaseñor's positive claim that "the Scholastic concept of the world and of life must be insisted upon."²⁰ Contemporary man simply does not find that a satisfying answer to the problems of the twentieth century. Ortega (and so many others) are right. Men no longer abide in faith in God. If faith in God is rejected, surely scholasticism cannot be accepted.

We must now consider the problem of building an

ethic from this point in our development. We start where the failure of Ortega's vitalism leaves us, with our disillusioned living. In fact, we start with even less than Ortega--without faith in the "inner call," or in the self-proclaimed righteousness of self-proclaimed leaders. It so happens that at least one thinker has taken exactly this problem as his starting point and he was brought to this starting point by the phenomenon of Nazism. The thinker to whom I refer is Albert Camus. More strikingly, the solution he propounds, and which I for the most part agree with, is remarkably similar in structure to the theory of scientific knowledge developed by Karl Popper.

Camus starts his search for values from many of the same assumptions which Ortega accepts. They both find God absent and science inadequate, and Camus, like Ortega, begins with nothing but man's disillusioned living. In Camus' early works--The Myth of Sisyphus, The Stranger, and the play Caligula--he espoused an ethic of individual satisfaction.²¹ This was based on his well-known theory of the absurd, which stated that man and the world were hopelessly irreconciled. Man desperately wanted the world to have a meaning, but it had none. All a man could do, given the situation, was commit suicide, or go on living and live as much as possible in the face of an irrational world. This view, based on the confrontation of the in-

dividual and the world, led to the position that all acts were morally equivalent. "There is no pro or con: the murderer is neither right nor wrong. We are free to stoke the crematory fires or to devote ourselves to the care of lepers."²² Camus sets up a quantitative ethic on this basis. The best living is the most living. To illustrate his position, he singles out "heroes" of excess: Caligula, Don Juan, the actor (who leads many lives), etc.²³ Notice that this stage of Camus' ethics corresponds closely to Ortega's notion of a quantitative hierarchy of increasing vitality. But this position is just a first step for Camus, not his complete or final position.

When Camus came face to face with the Third Reich, he realized just how much this early ethic had to be modified. In that early work, he took the position that one lived to the fullest, knowing that death always lay at the end. The Nazis, however, confronted him with an example of men who were living to the fullest by furiously shoving people by the millions into the ovens, and from all reports, enjoying every minute of it. (I am referring to Hitler, Goebbels, Goering, etc., not necessarily to the men who were actually manning the ovens.) Camus felt compelled to abandon his initial working assumptions that, in the face of the absurd, all acts are morally equivalent, and that human life is totally meaningless. Speaking of the Nazis, he says: "If this world has no meaning, they are right.

I do not accept that they are right. Hence..."²⁴ Camus leaves it to the reader to draw the conclusion to the modus tollens. Elsewhere in the Notebooks, he affirms that it is no disgrace for a thinker to modify his views.

Let's suppose a philosopher, who after having published several works declares in a new book: 'Up to now I was going in the wrong direction...I think now that I was wrong.' No one would take him seriously any more. And yet, he would then be giving proof that he is worthy of thought.²⁵

Camus bases his revision on the phenomenon of rebellion. There are two distinct types of rebellion considered in Camus' work. One is the rebellion of a man who finds the universe meaningless yet who goes on living in defiance of a meaningless world. Here, however, we speak of rebelling against treatment by other people which one finds unacceptable. This rebellion occurs when one somehow feels that the other has gone too far, that the torment has gone on too long. In the act of rebellion, the rebel asserts that some limit, some borderline, has been transgressed. He says that some essential right of his has been violated.

[H]e is acting in the name of certain values ...which he feels are common to himself and to all men. We see that the affirmation implicit in every act of rebellion is extended to something that transcends the individual ...It is for the sake of everyone in the world that the slave asserts himself when he comes to the conclusion that a command has infringed on something which does not belong to him alone, but which is common ground where all men--even the man who insults and oppresses him--have a natural community.²⁶

Thus for Camus the phenomenon of rebellion teaches that there is a common core, a common human nature, in all men, which, if it is intruded upon, brings about the act of rebellion. Rebellion teaches this because it is not an egoistic act. "It can be caused by the mere spectacle of oppression of which someone else is the victim."²⁷ Men rebel and often die to affirm the existence of something in themselves which is inviolable and goes beyond them. If one's own life were the sole value, one would never voluntarily give it up. But men do give up their lives in the name of others. They affirm some value that transcends their own lives. They make such sacrifices both against the injustices of the world and of other men. Both a doctor fighting an epidemic and a rebel fighting some unacceptable tyranny assert this human solidarity at the risk of their own lives.

To say that rebellion asserts the existence of a value is only indirectly correct. Rebellion reveals a limit beyond which the rebel will not be pushed. This does not say that the limit cannot be crossed, for the Nazi movement, for instance, shows that it can be crossed. But the one who crosses the limit brings on his own destruction. This resultant destruction is expressed in one of Camus' favorite myths: the myth of Nemesis. "Nemesis--the goddess of measure. All those who have overstepped the limit will be pitilessly destroyed."²⁸

When someone crosses that limit, he arouses the rebellion that will bring on his own destruction. Thus he who crosses the limit is really choosing suicide. If one values one's own life, one must also respect the limits which examples of rebellion have revealed, or negate the value of one's own life. These limits then give an ethical directive. One is free to cross the limit but one ought not to if one values one's life. Thus one ought to respect the rights (or at least the freedom of action) of others, at least up to that point at which the others may rebel.

Although rebellion gives us a value beyond egoism, it seems an empirical fact that rebellion tends to lose sight of its origins and become excessive in its own right. To demand one's rights often leads to the denial of those rights to others. Rebellion then oversteps its limits and leads to a new rebellion. The rebel must maintain a delicate balance between freedom and justice. Rebellion always says both yes and no. It says no in that it asserts that a limit has been transgressed. It says "this far, but no farther." But it also says yes in affirming the existence of a human dignity common to all men. It affirms that men are not isolated from each other. Rebellion affirms that the unjust condition which the individual discovers in the absurd is shared by all men.

The type of rebellion we have been discussing is perhaps best exemplified by the massive, world-wide up-

rising against Hitler and the Nazis. The Nazis provide a classic example of the trampling of any and all rights of those who stood in their way. Through their extreme excesses, they brought upon themselves their own annihilation. This operation of the "law of Nemesis" shows that the Nazis were wrong, refutes their actions. This does not mean that losing always shows that the loser was wrong. When we speak of rebellion, it is usually in a context of an unequal distribution of power. When those in power so misuse their power as to bring on a rebellion, it is they who are wrong, not the rebels. Rebellion can, and often does, bring about reforms even though the rebels are defeated. The case of the Nazis was so clear-cut that the rebellion against them utterly destroyed them. Seldom, however, do we have such a clear-cut case. In ordinary living, we often encounter hostility and rebellion from others. Does that mean that the action that engendered the rebellion was "wrong"? Not necessarily, but at least it should serve as a warning to re-examine our policies, and attempt to clearly communicate them, and our reasons for them, to the people involved. When things are less clear than in the case of the Nazis, we need to become aware more acutely of our state of ignorance, and attempt to reach accommodation through dialogue.

This combination of our ignorance, our common humanness, and our limited but real ability to communicate,

supplies another reason for condemning murder. For to kill is to end absolutely any hope of communication with the person killed. It is to assert an absolute judgment in the absence of absolute knowledge. The only exceptions which can be allowed must be desperate ones, such as when one's life is immediately threatened, or when everyone's life is threatened, as with the Nazis.

Through a realization of our relative ignorance and through the study of rebellion, Camus finds a way to justify opposition to murder and to the Nazis, and to overcome the absurd. "What balances the absurd is the community of men fighting against it."²⁹ In this way, Camus finds something beyond the individual, that is, our common humanness, by which to live in the face of the absurd.

Villaseñor has pointed out that it is just this lack of belief in anything beyond the individual that lands Ortega's thought in nihilism, but he is convinced that "beyond the individual" means God. Camus sees a need for something beyond the individual, but not for anything beyond humanity. It may be noted that Popper, like Camus, sees human nature and human solidarity as sources of value. For Popper, however, it is man's ability to reason, to participate in give-and-take discussion, that unifies mankind. Camus, like Ortega, has suffered a loss of faith in reason, and believes that love, rather than

reason, is the potential link between all men. We have seen in Chapter Two that Ortega does not believe in human nature. In addition, he does not believe in the unity of mankind; each man is irrevocably bound to his generation and his nationality. He believes in a sequence of generational human natures, each one radically different from all the rest.

The trouble with Ortega's approach is that it provides no external check on whether or not a man or a group is right in its beliefs or its actions. Ortega's notion of a private, personal source of ethical truth leads to the same problems and has the same structure as his erroneous method of finding scientific truth. I want to show that Camus' ethical position, on the other hand, can be seen in rather strict analogy to Popper's fallibilist position by which we learn from our mistakes and approach closer to the truth. To be perhaps excessively formal, Ortega's theory of science is to Popper's theory of science as Ortega's ethics is to Camus' ethics.

The key to this analysis is that for Camus and Popper, the important thing is correcting our errors and learning from them. Ortega seems to think that we do not need to worry about error, because only we can determine our destiny and if we follow his "radical method" correctly, we will not make any errors. So the difference is that Camus and Popper think we can know when we

are wrong but not when we are right, and Ortega thinks we can know when we are right, and more importantly, that knowing we are right is a private affair. The position of Camus and Popper is the rather modest one that we do not know, but that we can learn.

Camus modified his ethical system because he saw the Nazi phenomenon as a "refutation" of his earlier position. Rebellion is that refuting datum which tells you that you have overstepped a limit, gotten "out of line," as the cliché goes. You have no mechanism for judging your behavior right, but incurring another's rebellion may show you when you have erred.³⁰ This opens up the possibility, for a person and for a society, of an evolving system of ethics built up through a long series of "actions and refutations," as science is an evolutionary process of conjectures and refutations. The situation is much more difficult in ethics than in science, as Camus knew very well. Progress, though possible, is painfully slow.

It requires bucketsful of blood and centuries of history to lead to an imperceptible modification in the human condition...For years heads fall like hail, terror reigns, Revolution is touted, and one ends up by substituting constitutional monarchy for legitimate monarchy.³¹

But although we may learn slowly, we still do learn, and we learn by trial and error. Improvement is possible.

The problem with Ortega's position is that it assumes both too much and too little. He overrates man's

abilities to think on an individual level, and underrates man's ability to learn through social interaction. In science, he thinks we must retire alone and think up the truth. In morality, we also retire alone and discover our true vocation. "In solitude, man is his truth; in society, he tends to be his mere conventionality or falsification."³² The assumption is that man can avoid error, not through subjecting his thoughts and actions to criticism by others, but by private soul-searching. In science, his emphasis is always on discovering truth, not on testing our conjectures. In ethics, our mission is our own affair, and there is no inter-subjective test of whether or not we are right in pursuing it. His theory of generational species and his emphasis on the radical differences between men of different times and places drastically reduce the possibility of our learning from others, save from our immediate peers.

This conflict between discovering truth and finding error is not just a matter of taste; it is not some kind of optimist-versus-pessimist dispute. There are reasons of a purely logical nature for preferring the falsification approach to the truth-finding approach. Since theories involve universal statements, it requires only particular statements to refute them. The existence of a single white crow refutes the universal "all crows are black." We can be certain when a universal is false if

we hit on the right experimental test. Universals are much more difficult to establish than to falsify. There are also historical reasons for preferring the falsification approach. We have the classic example of laws which all educated people were absolutely certain were right, Newton's laws, and which turned out to be wrong, or at least not absolutely correct.

In the case of Camus' ethics, he uses a falsification approach in seeing Nazism as wrong, even though he is not sure what is right. This, at least, gives a basis for action. "[O]ne may even have to fight a lie in the name of a quarter truth."³³ One acts, but with caution, not certain one is right, not as if God were on one's side. One's ethic is modest, allowing freedom up to the point of another's rebellion. Only extreme behaviors, such as murder, are prohibited.

Camus and Ortega see the situation of contemporary man in the same way. They both recognize that God is absent and that reason and science are inadequate replacements. Both agree that "man finds himself compelled to take his stand on the only thing still left to him, his disillusioned life."³⁴ Camus discovers a new faith in the solidarity of the community of mankind facing the absurd. Ortega does not believe in such a democratic theory, and puts his faith in the historical sequence of ruling elites. When the Hitlers or the Mansons become the elite, the inadequacy of his theory is shown.

FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER VII

¹José Sánchez Villaseñor. Ortega y Gasset, Existentialist. Translated by Joseph Small (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1949).

²Ibid., p. 232.

³TOSAIE II, p. 393.

⁴Albert Camus. The Rebel. Translated by Anthony Bower (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1956).

⁵Albert Camus. Resistance, Rebellion, and Death. Translated by Justin O'Brien (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1960), p. 136.

⁶Ortega y Gasset, Existentialist, p. 34.

⁷Ibid., p. 230.

⁸Ibid., p. 41.

⁹See, for instance, TMT, pp. 76-7.

¹⁰TMT, p. 75.

¹¹TMT, p. 76.

¹²José Ortega y Gasset. On Love. Translated by Toby Talbot (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1957), p. 143.

¹³WIP, p. 17.

¹⁴This paragraph is a summary of pages 113-116 of Villaseñor's Ortega y Gasset, Existentialist.

¹⁵Ortega y Gasset, Existentialist, pp. 115-116.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 117.

¹⁷Some readers may find it blasphemous to link Napoleon with Hitler. I find all mass murderers, from Nero to Nixon, repulsive. It is only a system of education which teaches what Popper calls the history of international crime and mass murder under the name of history which would lead us to regard Napoleon as a hero. See chapters 24 and 25 of TOSAIE.

¹⁸TMT, p. 76.

¹⁹For a vivid and ghastly example of the worst consequences of listening exclusively to inner voices, see Ed Sanders' book on the rise and fall of Charles Manson, The Family (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1971).

²⁰Ortega y Gasset, Existentialist, p. 233.

²¹I have treated Camus' ethics at some length in an unpublished M. A. thesis, A System of Ethics Based on the Writings of Albert Camus (University of Oklahoma).

²²The Rebel, p. 5.

²³I do not think Camus ever believed this was a proper ethical position. It is a starting point toward

developing an ethic in a meaningless, irrational world. It is the kind of fictitious simplified model so often used in physics, for instance.

²⁴Albert Camus. Notebooks 1942-1951. Translated by Justin O'Brien (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1965), p. 97.

²⁵Ibid., p. 42.

²⁶The Rebel, p. 16.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Notebooks 1942-1951, p. 156.

²⁹Ibid., p. 126.

³⁰Camus draws up a kind of ethical program of specific prohibitions based on rebellion. See my A System of Ethics Based on the Writings of Albert Camus.

³¹Notebooks 1942-1951, p. 119.

³²MAP, p. 99.

³³Resistance, Rebellion and Death, p. 189.

³⁴HAAS, p. 230.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUDING REMARKS

With Chapter Seven, our critique of Ortega's work is ended. We have attempted to show that his denial of human nature and his downgrading of pure reason can lead to conclusions which can be used in support of conquest and violence. We have also attempted to show that his notion of historical reason is no more than a rediscovery of the doctrine of historicism, and is not, as he claimed, the new revelation needed by contemporary man. In addition, he has not discovered any great new historical tool which will bring about a magnificent flowering of social science, as he also claimed.

In spite of these results, it was claimed in Chapter One that Ortega was an important philosopher, and well worth criticizing.¹ Are these two views compatible? Is it possible to claim that some of Ortega's most cherished ideas--historical reason, generation, true destiny--are contradictory, dangerous, even ridiculous, and still claim that he is an important philosopher? I think that it is. One of the main points made in Chapter One must not be forgotten: Ortega was responsible for the revival of philosophy in the entire Spanish-speaking world, and for creating a philosophical vocabulary in the Spanish language. Almost

single-handedly, he brought Spanish philosophy out of the Middle Ages. He made the leap from Suárez to Heidegger for the Hispanic world. That his name is now so often linked with those of Husserl, Heidegger, Dilthey, and other great modern philosophers goes a long way toward establishing his stature. His is a monumental achievement, for which Spain and Latin America owe him an undying gratitude.

What has been done in this dissertation is to isolate some weak spots in Ortega's philosophy and to criticize them rather aggressively. This does not mean that there are no other aspects of his thought worthy of praise. It only means that his thought is flawed, perhaps seriously flawed. It would truly be a miracle if a man raised in Spain in the late nineteenth century, with no modern philosophical tradition in which to work, produced a system which was not seriously flawed. Holdovers from medieval thought were almost inevitable. Ortega's essentialism is perhaps such a holdover. Many weaknesses in his thought are consequences of the fact that he saw his main mission as that of bringing thought back into Spanish life, rather than another possible mission, that of producing the best philosophy of which he was capable. Ortega is often accused, by Villaseñor, for instance, of being superficial, of picking up themes and then dropping them. This is perfectly understandable if we realize that Ortega saw himself as the founder of modern philosophical thought in

Spain. He had to introduce as many themes, as many fertile areas of future research as possible. This need for incredible breadth forced upon him the uncomfortable necessity of treating many themes rather lightly, rather than just a few in great depth. It is simply indisputable that Ortega was magnificently successful in his role as a motivator, as one whose task is to excite others to question, to think, to do philosophy.

As to those specific aspects of Ortega's work which have been criticized--his idea of scientific methodology and his philosophy of history--a case can be made that mixed in with his essentialism and historicism one can find a more contemporary, sophisticated, though still flawed, philosophy of scientific method, as well as some sophisticated ideas about history, especially the history of thought. Although he usually espoused the barren method of essentialism in science, there are passages in which he saw that what science does is to construct and test models. When we are studying some phenomena, "we imagine a reality, or to put it another way, we construct an imaginary reality, a pure invention of our own."² This is the model. Then, still within the realm of thought, we deduce "facts" from our model. "It is then that we come out of our imaginative solitude...and compare those facts which the imagined reality would produce with the actual facts which surround us."³

Science then, "consists of two different operations:

one purely imaginative and creative...the other a confronting of that which is not man."⁴ This is not so different from the theory of science which Popper, for example, defends. It is a method of conjecture and test. The missing piece, and it is the most important piece, in this approach is Ortega's failure to realize the crucial role played in science by refutations. In one field, however, Ortega was fully aware of, and vigorously defended, the method of progress by conjectures and refutations. That field was the history of philosophy. In his excellent book The Origin of Philosophy, he argued that today's philosopher lives by understanding and overcoming the errors of past philosophers.

Unfortunately, he did not realize that philosophy was by no means unique in using this approach. In fact, philosophy uses this method much less than does physics, for instance. For it is seldom the case that any one philosophy is actually the accepted one at any given time. In physics, one can almost always speak of the accepted physical knowledge of the day. This means that there is a much less clear road of progress in philosophy because one does not know which philosophical error to correct. And refuted philosophies have a nasty habit of refusing to die gracefully, often hanging about for centuries. Nonetheless, at least Ortega pleads for us to learn from our mistakes in philosophy, even if he overestimates the extent to which we actually do so. He presents as already

in existence what we hope can exist: "The philosopher who lived for twenty-five hundred years can be said to exist: he is the present-day philosopher."⁵

If we have harshly criticized the consequences of Ortega's philosophy, and especially of his philosophy of history, this is in no way a charge that he was a hired pen. Popper's charge that Hegel was a hired pen of the Prussian government, and that Hegel's philosophy is no more than an apology for Prussian despotism, is notorious. I have no wish to get involved in the dispute over Hegel's intellectual honesty. But surely no such accusation of disingenuousness can be lodged against Ortega. His life was always lived on the side of freedom and justice.

Although I feel that Ortega was completely mistaken in thinking that history had an internal logic, he certainly was right in stressing the importance of history, and of seeing history as a vast treasure of failed experiments. This emphasis on the past as a series of errors shows again that in parts of his philosophy, he saw the vital role played by learning from mistakes, and the great importance of not repeating historical mistakes through an ignorance of history. Ortega also realized, at least in The Revolt of the Masses, that man in our time was in danger of losing contact with his greatest possession, his past. He recognized that man's basic right to continuity must not be violated.

It is unfortunate that Ortega coupled his emphasis on the vital importance of history with his theory of the radical differences between generations. For if human life really changes so greatly from generation to generation, how can men of one generation learn effectively from the "mistakes" of some previous generation? Even if we could, by "historical reason," penetrate into the life of a past period, how could their decisions apply in our own time, which is alleged to be so different from and alien to previous periods? Nonetheless, his great emphasis on history is a valuable contribution. He stands solidly with Camus, Popper, and many others in insisting on man's right to his past, and in opposing any totalitarian efforts to falsify the past in the manner so vividly described by George Orwell.

While Ortega mistakenly took trends in history for inexorable historical laws, he was nonetheless a master of uncovering historical trends. Witness his early realization of the growing disillusion with science, and his equally early realization of the impact of Einstein's theories. He correctly and very early saw that science was dead as a revealer of absolute reality, and that men who needed to live on faith would have to look elsewhere for it. In line with this, he noticed that several times in history a period of disillusionment with some alleged avenue to truth led to an age of gullibility. In such ages,

the most absurd idiocies were swallowed whole, and "the most absurd rites attract the adhesion of the multitude."⁶ He feared that western civilization might be entering such a period, such an age of superstition, and this prediction seems to be in the process of being fulfilled in this era of proliferating religions and drug cults.

Ortega also spotted the trend toward finitism and intuitionism in mathematics when few other thinkers were taking the work of Brouwer and others seriously. In sociology, he brilliantly analyzed the impact of the population explosion in western society. We should not forget that The Revolt of the Masses was first published in 1930. It reads as though it were written yesterday.

If we think of Ortega as opening up interesting view-points on history, ignoring his overblown claim to have discovered its "own autochthonous reason," he becomes a fertile and interesting philosopher of history. His insights into the history of technology are very exciting. His idea of looking at usages in search of their past significance opens up an intriguing area of research for philosophers, historians, and sociologists to explore. There are many other examples. If Ortega had presented these ideas as no more than interesting points of view on history, we could praise rather than criticize him, and such an approach would have fitted in so well with his own perspectivist theory--the taking up of a point of view on

history rather than the untenable claim of finding the one true point of view. Popper has suggested that historians should simply write the history that interests them and which is interesting and useful to the men of their time.

[S]ince each generation has its own troubles and problems, and therefore its own interests and its own point of view, it follows that each generation has a right to look upon and re-interpret history in its own way, which is complementary to that of previous generations.⁷

The perspectivist part of Ortega might have written that passage.

The truly basic flaw in Ortega's work is that he applied his perspectivism in the wrong place. He failed to realize that it is precisely in history that we can get only a partial view, only a perspective. He wrongly asserted that we could know the totality of our past, and even predict our future. In fact, all we can do is hope to learn enough from history not to commit old mistakes. But instead of applying his perspectivist theory in history, where it belongs, he applied it to science, where it definitely does not belong. In science, we have a clear criterion of progress and a clear way of deciding at any given time what theory is the best available one in any given area. We do not have the science of each generation as simply a series of theories, no one any better than the others; rather, we have a succession of

theories each one better than all the previous ones in this chain of progress.

The above characterization of progress in science is, to some extent, idealized. Scientists do not always consider new theories dispassionately in the hope of finding a theory which is better than a presently accepted one. The notorious and shameful treatment of Immanuel Velikovsky is perhaps the best-known recent example of this kind of scientific bigotry. Nonetheless, I think it is still true that this method of conjectures and refutations has been best and most consistently applied in the physical sciences. There are also certain excellent examples, some extending over several centuries, of the method of conjectures and refutations being applied in philosophy. One such example is the progression of cosmological theories which began with Thales and perhaps culminated in the atomism of Democritus. Another example is the development of British empiricism from Bacon to Hume. These examples fit very well Ortega's theory of progress in philosophy, wherein philosophy makes progress by overcoming errors.

I think, however, that Ortega was too optimistic about history and philosophy and too pessimistic about science. In his intense desire for a predicting science of history and a solid philosophy on which to stand in a shaking world, he proclaimed that these subjects were al-

ready in existence. He was right in saying that science does not reveal reality nor does it reveal the future; he was right when he said that the past is all we have as we face an uncertain future. But he should have left it at that rather than raising the false hope that our future is really not uncertain, and that there is a "method" by which we can predict the future and thus remove our intense anxiety about where we are going. Our future is uncertain, but we do have science, technology, philosophy, and our knowledge of our past to help us make the hard decisions that will face us, and that arsenal is cause for hope, not despair.

FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER VIII

¹Of course, one might argue that any widely known and widely accepted thinker is worth criticizing (or combatting) even if the critic believes that the thinker's ideas are absurd. This is clearly the relation between Popper and Hegel, for instance. Popper criticizes Hegel only because other people have taken Hegel seriously. In this Chapter, I want to defend the view that there is substance to Ortega's thought, and that one may criticize it on grounds beyond a desire to negate its influence.

²MAC, p. 13.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵The Origin of Philosophy, p. 27.

⁶TMT, p. 134.

⁷TOSAIE II, p. 267.

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